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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND EXTERNAL
REWARDS ON INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
by
GARY S. GOLDSTEIN
University of New Hampshire, December, 1980
A number of studies have demonstrated that the presence
of an external reward reduces intrinsic motivation.
(1975)

Deci's

theory of cognitive evaluation and Lepper, Greene and

Nisbett's (1973) overjustification hypothesis account for
these findings using attribution theory.

Basically, these

two theories imply that when the reasons for performing a be
havior can be attributed to the activity itself, the behavior
will most likely be self-sustained without any external
inducement.

However, to the extent that a person attributes

the cause of his or her behavior to some external constraint,
it is likely that the behavior will be performed only in the
presence of that constraint.
Most studies have focused primarily on the detrimental
effect of concrete rewards on intrinsically interesting acti
vities (e.g., money, prizes, food).

Recent studies have

extended the problem to include other types of external con
straints which are less tangible than the above rewards.

The

present study focused on one such external variable that might
reduce intrinsic motivation:

competition.

To test this hypothesis, a two by two factorial design
was employed with two levels of Reward (Reward and No Reward)
and two levels of Competition (Competition and No Competition).
Thirty-two pairs of undergraduate males were randomly as
signed to the four cells of the design, with eight pairs per
cell.

A methodology similar to ones used in the literature

was employed for the present study.

The target activity was

Soma, a puzzle task which required the subjects to reproduce
two dimensional pictures with three dimensional blocks.
Rewarded subjects were paid 50 cents for each correct item
for a maximum of two dollars.

No mention of reward was made

to subjects in the No Reward conditions.

Subjects in the

Competition conditions were read instructions which indicated
that they were working on the same task as the other subject
and that the experimenter was going to compare their perfor
mance.

Subjects in the No Competition conditions were told

that they were working on different tasks.

The amount of time

the subject played with the Soma task during a free choice
period served as the measure of intrinsic motivation.

In

addition, responses to two inventories measuring interest in
the task also served as a measure of intrinsic motivation.
It was predicted that subjects in the Competition condition
and the Reward condition would show less intrinsic motivation
than would those in the No Competition condition and No
Reward condition respectively.
In general, such predictions were not confirmed.

There

was no significant main effects for Reward in the expected

x

direction for any of the inventory items or free choice time.
In addition, only one inventory item for the Competition var
iable reached statistical significance.

The most consistent

pattern found in the data was a Reward by Competition inter
action which indicated that subjects in the Reward-No
Competition condition showed the least amount of intrinsic
motivation when compared with subjects in the other cdnditions.
An examination of the free choice time indicated a
bimodal distribution of scores.

For each cell, subjects had

a tendency to play with the task for a relatively long period
of time or for no time at all.

These differences were treated

as an additional independent variable related to free choice
time.

An ANOVA performed on this converted design indicated

that subjects who did not play with the task at all during the
free choice period rated themselves as more competitive than
did those who played with the task during this period, thus
providing some support for the hypothesis.

In addition,

subjects who did not play with the task at all during the free
choice

period also found the task more difficult during the

earlier phases of the experiment.

Thus, feelings of competency

may have also mediated the final results.
A number of reasons for the lack of positive results for
the Reward variable were explored.

These included (a) the

possibility that subjects did not believe they were going to
keep the reward,

Cbl a lack of initial interest in the task and

Cel a lask of sufficient external validity in the current de
sign which may have prevented the overjustification effect from
manifesting itself.
xi

CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Historical Introduction
Psychologists have used the concept of motivation to
answer the question of how behavior is energized and di
rected.

Traditionally, the answer to this question comes

under the heading of extrinsic motivation.

The cause of

behavior is reduced to some bodily tissue need such as food,
water, sex and the avoidance of tissue pain or to some ac
quired drive based on processes of secondary reinforcement
(Hunt, 1965).

In these cases of extrinsic motivation, the

person is performing the behavior for some goal independent
of the activity itself.

But both psychologists and lay

people have noted that various organisms maintain extensive
activity levels even when the above parameters are not
present.

There appears to be a second class of motivation

to perform an activity:

intrinsic motivation.

Although no precise theoretical conception of intrin
sic motivation has yet to be developed, a common element of
most definitions involves a person performing an activity
for no apparent reason except the activity itself.

Actions

are valued for their own sake and may be self-sustained
without any external inducement.

Although precise mech

anisms thought to underlie intrinsic motivation differ

1
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depending upon o n e 'a theoretical perspective, the above is
the commonly accepted definition of intrinsic motivation and
also serves quite adequately as an operational definition
(Deci, 1975a).
The concept of intrinsic motivation enjoyed little
theoretical and empirical attention during the early days
of experimental psychology.

Couched in the language of

early instinct theory, Woodworth (1918) noted that an acti
vity can provide its own drive derived from innate general
capacities or "native equipment."

He stated that "The end

furnishes the motive force for the search for means but once
the means are found, they are apt to become interesting on
their own account"

(p. 104) .

This idea is reiterated in

Allport's (1937) notion of functional autonomy.

In the

late 1940's and early 1950's much of the work was limited
to studies of curiosity, exploration, and manipulation in
animals (e.g., Berlyne, 1950; Butler, 1953; Butler & Harlow,
1957; Harlow, 1950; Montgomery, 1952).

The most common

approach used to explain these phenomena was that of drive
naming (.e.g., exploratory drive, manipulatory drive, a drive
to avoid'boredom).

White (1959) criticizes this drive

naming approach noting that these behaviors do not fit the
definitional constraints of traditional drive theory.

Unlike

drives, these intrinsically motivated behaviors are not asso
ciated with any non-nervous system deficit or a consumatory
response which reduces a need.

Instead, these activities

appear to be related to internally rewarding consequences
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which are located in the central nervous system and have no
appreciable biological effects on non-nervous system tissue.
Thus, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are qualitatively
distinct, and should not be defined in terms of the same
underlying conception.
Contemporary Approaches
Contemporary approaches to the study of intrinsic
motivation fall under one of two categories^":

(1) develop

mental theories which stress a theoretical account of the
general and developmental processes which underlie intrin
sically motivated behavior and (2) social theories which
stress the self-perceptions or phenomenological mechanisms
which account for the behavior.
Developmental Approaches
Developmental theories are of two general types and
have their roots in the same theoretical matrix.

White's

(1959) paper cited above reflects one of these positions.
His is a theory of effectance motivation which emphasizes
the person's need to have an effective and competent exchange
with the environment which produces a positive affective
feeling of competence and self-determination.

The theory

rejects drive-reduction theory and focuses on the person's
interaction with the environment including such processes
as exploration, manipulation, attention, perception and
third perspective, the competing response hypothesis
(Reiss and Sushinsky, 1975, 1976), approaches the issue from
a behavioristic paradigm.
Since its bearing on the research
in this paper is not as relevant as the social or develop
mental approaches, it will not be reviewed here.

thought.

In young children, White argues, effectance moti

vation may be quite undifferentiated, whereas in adults, it
becomes differentiated into more specific motives for mastery,
cognizance and achievement.
The second of these two developmental approaches is
incongruity (or novelty or complexity) theory.

These ap

proaches have their roots in Piaget's equilibration theory
and are best explicated in the works of Hunt (1965) and
Berlyne (1973).

These theories regard human beings as infor

mation processing systems and assert that intrinsic motivation
is inherent in information processing.

They maintain that

there is something inherently interesting in the reduction
of uncertainty and the acquisition of knowledge which is
inherent in this informational process.
Hunt argues that we acquire various informational stan
dards through our informational exchange with the environment.
These standards are compared with the incoming stimulus input
of the moment.

When there is an optimal level of incongruity

between the input stimuli and the standard of comparison, the
person will be motivated to reduce that incongruity.

In

other words, this optimal level notifies the person that an
informational situation exists which activates and directs
behavior.

This model is very simliar to the TOTE unit des

cribed by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960).
This notion of incongruity is comparable to Berlyne's
concept of collative variables.

These are variables that

derive their meaning from the relationship and comparison of
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receptive input of the moment and residues of past experience.
In general, they refer to the differences and similarities
between stimuli (e.g., novelty, complexity, uncertainty,
or surprise).
Social Approaches
The second general category of approaches to intrinsic
motivation lies in the social position.

Unlike the develop

mental perspective, these theories do not address themselves
to the theoretical processes that might underlie intrinsic
motivation (i.e., competence or the reduction of uncertain
ty) , but only to the self-perceptions or attributions a
person makes about why he or she is motivated.
At its most general level, attribution theory deals
with the question of how an individual gains knowledge about
the causal structure of the world around him or her.

Accord

ingly, when an individual observes another person engaging
in some activity, he or she infers that the other is intrin
sically motivated to engage in that activity to the extent
that he or she does not perceive sufficient extrinsic con
tingencies to which to attribute the other's behavior.
However,"according to Bern (1965, 1967), from which these
social approaches gain their theoretical impetus, the attri
butions a person makes about his or her self, or processes
of "self-perception," have a common ground with those he
or she makes about others, or processes of "other-perception."
Therefore, Bern proposes that inference processes similar to
the ones described above will help determine the perception

6

of one's own motivation.

To the extent that a person attri

butes the cause of his or her own behavior to some external
constraint, it is likely that the person will only perform
the behavior in the presence of that constraint.
can be said to be extrinsically motivated.

He or she

But when the

reasons for performing the behavior can be attributed to the
activity itself, there is a greater chance that the behavior
will be self-sustained without the external inducement.

The

person can be said to be intrinsically motivated.
As a result of this emphasis on attributions, social psy
chologists have focused primarily on the effects that external
rewards may have on changing intrinsic motivation.

Using

this as a basis, Lepper, Greene and Nisbett (1973) have pro
posed the "overjustification hypothesis."

The hypothesis

predicts that a people's intrinsic interest in an activity may
be undermined by reward since it may change their perception of
why they are motivated.

Notice that this hypothesis does not

concern itself with the definition of reward per se (i.e., if
reward is defined empirically as increasing the probability of
response or phenomenologically as producing an internal state
of satisfaction).

Instead, it is concerned with the effects

that rewards have on attributional processes.
Deci's Integrative Approach
Edward Deci (1971, 1972a, 1975a, 1975b) has attempted
to integrate the developmental and social positions in his
theory of "cognitive evaluation."

The central metatheore-

tical starting point for Deci's perspective is the assumption
that internal states do cause behavior (Deci, 1975b).
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Motives, emotions and cognitions play a central part in ener
gizing and directing behavior.

Deci (1975c) states, "The

first thing I'd like to emphasize is that the study of moti
vation is a study of causes of behavior.

The process begins

before the behavior; it energizes and directs the behavior"
(p. 2).

Therefore, Deci rejects a purely descriptive defini

tion of intrinsic motivation as behavior which is motivated
when there are no apparent external rewards.

Instead he seeks

to provide a meaningful account of the processes that underlie
these behaviors.

Referring to the work of White (1959) and

de Charms (1968), Deci suggests that intrinsically motivated
behaviors are ones involved with the human need for being
competent and self-determining.
general classes.

These behaviors fall into two

The first class is behavior that people

engage in to seek out optimally challenging situations.
This is roughly equivalent to Hunt's notion of encountering
some optimally incongruent situation.

The second class is

behavior that aims to conquer the challenge.

In other words,

people are involved in an ongoing process of seeking and con
quering challenges (Deci, 1975b).

Thus, while Deci's position

draws most directly from White, it expands upon Hunt's posi
tion by considering the concept of challenge rather than
incongruity.
But Deci also incorporates the social perspective into
his position.

Like Lepper et al.

(1973) , he recognizes that

intrinsic motivation can be affected by the attributions one
makes about the causes of his or her behavior, or as in
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de Charms's nomenclature, "perceived locus of causality."
Indeed, most of Deci's research has been devoted to answering
the more empirical (and perhaps more practical) question of
what are the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic moti
vation.
According to cognitive evaluation theory, there are two
processes by which rewards affect intrinsic motivation.

The

first process is a change in perceived locus of causality.
When behavior is intrinsically motivated, the perceived locus
of causality is said to be internal.

This means that the

person perceives the cause of a certain behavior to be his
or her own intrinsic needs.

This self-perception may alone

be enough to influence future behavior and attitudes.

How

ever, when the person receives extrinsic rewards, the per
ceived locus of causality may be changed and become external.
The external reward may lead the person to a process of cogni
tive reevaluation of the activity from one which is intrin
sically motivated to one which is motivated by the anticipation
of extrinsic rewards.

As de Charms indicated, the locus of

control or feeling of personal causation shifts to an external
source, the individual now considers himself a "pawn," and
views his or her undertaking of an activity in order to obtain
some external goal.

Thus, the person's intrinsic motivation

is reduced because he or she now believes that the extrinsic
rewards are the cause of the behavior.
The proposition assumes two important things.

First, it

is assumed that extrinsic rewards have more salience or impact
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than intrinsic rewards (for reasons, Deci, 1975a, admits, are
at present unclear) and may "co-opt" intrinsic motivation.
Secondly, if a person perceives the locus of causality to
be outside himself, he will behave in accordance with that
perception.
With regard to these propositions concerning locus of
causality, it appears that Deci's position is conceptually
identical to those of Lepper at al.

(1973).

Although re

stated in de Charms's terminology, cognitive evaluation
theory, like the overjustification hypothesis maintains that
a person's perception of why he or she is doing the task
determines his or her level of intrinsic motivation.
However, because Deci draws some of his theoretical
stance from the developmental theories described earlier, he
believes there is a second process by which rewards can affect
intrinsic motivation:
of competence.

they may change the person's feeling

Rewards that convey feelings of competence

increase intrinsic motivation, while those that convey feel
ings of incompetence decrease intrinsic motivation.

To

explore this issue, Deci asserts that rewards have two as
pects, a controlling aspect and an informational aspect.
The controlling aspect of a reward aims to control the
person's behavior and make him engage in acceptable behaviors.
This control initiates the change in perceived locus of
causality (as indicated earlier by Lepper et al., de Charms,
and Deci) resulting in a decrease in intrinsic motivation.
However, rewards can also provide information to a person
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about his or her effectiveness at the rewarded activity.

If

the information conveyed by the reward increases feelings of
competence, there will be an increase in intrinsic motiva
tion.

If the information conveyed by the reward increases

feelings of incompetence, then there will be a decrease in
intrinsic motivation.

Thus it is suggested that a distinc

tion should be made between the different kinds of external
rewards and that the relative salience of the above two
aspects may determine if intrinsic motivation is increased
or decreased.

The act of reinforcement is seen as an act

of communication, and the undermining effect of the reward
may be due to what is communicated (Feingold and Mahoney,
1975).
It is important to note that Deci is not suggesting
that extrinsic rewards do not motivate behavior.

There are

certainly countless studies which indicate that extrinsic
rewards do motivate behavior.

However, Deci argues, reward

ing people extrinsically may have certain unintended conse
quences on certain internal cognitive processes.

Since these

internal states have a direct relationship to subsequent
intrinsic motivation, a resulting decrease in the persistence
of behavior will occur.

Again, it is important to'take note

of Deci's cognitive position which argues for the importance
of internal events as causal links in understanding behavior.
Different examples of rewards may serve as a useful way
to clarify the above propositions.

Money, for example,

because of its connotation and use in our society, may
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suggest to a person that she or he should not perform the
activity without pay.

Because of its salient controlling

aspect, it will cause the locus of causality for performing
the activity to shift from the activity to the reward.

The

"cause" of the person's behavior will now lie in the external
reward resulting in a reduction of behavior when the reward
is removed.

The presence of negative feedback may also

reduce intrinsic motivation according to cognitive evaluation
theory.

However, unlike money, the reason may not lie in any

attributional shifts, but because this type of feedback
communicates to the person that he or she is incompetent.
On the other hand, positive verbal feedback or approval may
increase subsequent intrinsic motivation.

These rewards

are more likely to increase feelings of competence and are
less likely to be perceived as controlling behavior.

CHAPTER II
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The Effects of External Rewards
Although the topic of intrinsic motivation had received
considerable theoretical attention for many years, it is
only within the last decade that it has begun to be empiri
cally tested in the laboratory.

Parts of Deci's cognitive

evaluation theory were first tested in 1971 and have been
elaborated through a series of studies since then.
Deci (1971) introduced a basic tridactic design in his
initial work in which the behavior of subjects was observed
during three different periods.

First, subjects were given

instructions to perform a target activity with no mention of
an external reward.

Then, in a second phase, experimental

subjects were rewarded for the activity, while the controls
were not.

Finally, rewards were removed and the persistence

of activity was assessed.
The experiment consisted of three one hour sessions held
on separate days.

During each session subjects worked on a

puzzle called Soma which required the reproduction of twodimensional pictures using three dimensional cubes.

Subjects

were given four puzzles and allowed 13 minutes for each
session.

To minimize the possibility that the Zeigarnik

(1927) effect would influence later performance, subjects
were shown the solution' to any puzzle that could not be
12
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solved.

During the first session, subjects were told they

would spend all three sessions using the cubes to form
various configurations.

During the second session, experi

mental subjects were paid one dollar for each configuration
they were able to reproduce within the thirteen minute time
limit, whereas the control subjects were given the same task
without pay.

Finally, in the third session, both groups

were given more configurations, but neither group received
pay.

The experimental subjects were told they would not be

paid for the third session because there was only enough money
available to pay for one of the sessions.

To obtain the

measure of intrinsic motivation in the study, the experimenter
left the room for eight minutes in the middle of each session
under the pretext of determining the appropriate configura
tion to give the subject "based upon his performance up to
that point in the experiment."

As he left the room, he told

the subjects they could do whatever they wanted, including
reading some current magazines

(New Yorker, Time, Playboy)

which were conspicuously available.

The experimenter then

observed and timed the subjects behavior through a one way
mirror during the eight minute free choice period.

The opera

tional definition of intrinsic motivation was the amount of
time the subjects spent working on the puzzle when there were
other things to do.

Comparisons were made for the changes

in puzzle working behavior displayed by the experimental
subjects from the first to the third session relative to the
controls.

The results indicated that experimental subjects
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showed less intrinsic motivation in the third session than
they had in the first, whereas no such decrease in intrinsic
movitation of controls is reported (t is not reported,

2 < .10).
The study is not without its methodological shortcom
ings.

Calder and Staw (1975a) note that during the experi

mental session prior to the free choice period, there is the
possibility that the different experimental conditions might
have produced differential performance by the subjects or,
as Scott (1975) maintains, different "conditioning treat
ments."

This may have created an uncontrollable variable

which could have contaminated the results.

However, Deci,

Cascio, and Krusell (1975) present data which show there was
no significant differences between the paid and unpaid
subjects on the amount of time they spent working on the
puzzles or the average number of correct solutions during the
experimental manipulation phase of the experiment.

Since

there are no significant differences in these performance
data, little support can be given to Calder and Staw and
Scott's criticism.

Also, results from Kruglanski, Alon and

Lewis (1972), Ross (1975), and Ross, Karniol and Rothstein
(1976), indicate that performance differences during the ini
tial phase of the experiment are not necessary to produce
subsequent decrements in intrinsic motivation after having
engaged in an activity for external rewards.
A second methodological ambiguity in Deci's study arises
during session two of the experiment.

During this session,
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there was a large increase in the amount of time that rewarded
subjects played with the task during the free choice period.
This makes sense, since subjects were now being paid for their
behavior and as Deci asserts, were probably practicing pro
blems to increase their chance of earning money.

However,

there is the possibility that the subsequent decrease in
activity during session three was not due to the withdrawal
of rewards, but to the effect of satiation or fatique from
the increased play in session two.
Lepper et al.

However, in studies by

(1973), Ross (1975), and Pritchard, Campbell

and Campbell (1977), the amount of time between the rewarded
and free choice sessions was far greater than that used by
Deci.

For example, in the research of both Lepper et al.

and Pritchard et al., this time period was extended to one
week.

In Ross's research, this period was one month in

length.

In all three studies, Deci1s results were replicated.

It seems very unlikely that fatigue or satiation could
account for the results using these methodologies.
Finally, one could argue that the decrease in intrinsic
motivation in Deci's experiment follows not only the prior
administration of extrinsic reward, but also the withdrawal
of reward.

Thus decrease in intrinsic motivation might then

be due to the frustration following the removal of the reward
and not the processes hypothesized by Deci.

A study by

Kruglanski, Freedman and Zeevi (1971) resolves this ambiguity.
In their study, the experimenters told half the subjects
that because they had volunteered for the study, they would
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be taken on an interesting tour of the psychology labora
tory; the other subjects were not offered the reward.

The

results showed that subjects offered the reward were signi
ficantly less satisfied with the target activity as measured
by an attitudinal inventory, and significantly less likely
to volunteer for future experiments of a simliar nature than
non-rewarded subjects.

Notice however, that since the reward

was never withdrawn from the experimental group (since it
was only promised but not given), the difference between the
two conditions cannot be explained by a frustration effect.
A related frustration effect was explored by Ross et al.
(1976).

These experimenters argue that in many of the studies

testing Deci's hypothesis, the subjects are offered a reward
but are not given it until they have performed the target
activity.

Such a delay might induce feelings of frustration

in the subject

which become associated with the activity and

thereby make it somewhat aversive.

Thus, the decrease in

subsequent intrinsic motivation may be accounted for by the
aversiveness of the activity rather than the attributional
processes suggested by Deci.

This argument would seem more

valid for children than adults, since children would be
more likely to experience this waiting period as frustrating.
To test whether the critical variable is the actual rewardtask contingency as suggested by Deci, or this frustration
affect associated with a delay period, Ross et al. assigned
third graders to one of three groups.

In the wait-contingent

group, subjects received the delayed reward for explicitly

17

undertaking the target activity (drawing).

Control subjects

were neither promised nor given a reward and were simply
asked to wait for the experimenter to return.

In the wait-

contingent and task-contingent condition, the experimenter
added prior to leaving that another teacher might come in
and ask them to draw some pictures.

He left the room and

about one minute later, a second experimenter entered and
asked the subjects in all the groups to draw.

This experi

menter left after about six minutes and the first experimenter
returned, rewarded the appropriate subjects and displayed
a number of additional toys as well as the drawing supplies.
The experimenter explained that there was some time left
over and that the subjects could play with anything they
wished.

During this 15 minute free play period, the subjects'

behavior was observed through a one-way mirror.

If a frustra

tion effect was present, subjects in the wait-contingent and
task-contingent group should have shown less interest in
the target activity than the control group.

If Deci's

perspective is correct, a decrease in intrinsic motivation
should have occured solely in the task-contingent group and
the wait-contingent and control group subjects should not
differ.

The results support the latter hypothesis.-

Subjects

in the wait-contingent group played with the drawing equip
ment significantly more than subjects in the task-contingent
group.

In addition, the task-contingent condition produced

significantly less play than the combined wait-contingent
and control group.
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Thus, although Deci1s original experimental design had
some weaknesses in its methodology, the studies reviewed
above clarify these ambiguities and give strong support to
what might have been equivocal conclusions.

Not only do

they rule out some alternative explanations for the cognitive
evaluation effect, but each can stand on its own as supporting
the contention that extrinsic rewards can reduce intrinsic
motivation.
The Effects of Positive and Negative Verbal Rewards
Another major component of cognitive evaluation theory
predicts that the presence of negative verbal feedback can
reduce subsequent intrinsic motivation by diminishing the
person's feelings of competence and self-determination.

In

a study by Deci, Cascio and Krusell (1973), subjects who re
ceived negative feedback from an experimenter or through a
self administered process showed reduced intrinsic motivation
during a free choice period when compared with controls.
Thus, the data present clear evidence that negative feedback
decreases intrinsic motivation.
Deci also suggests that the presence of positive verbal
rewards should result in an ir/crease in intrinsic motivation.
In a second experiment in Deci's (1971) paper, he explores
this issue.

Using the same tridactic design, verbal rewards

were administered to subjects rather than monetary ones.
During the second session, experimental subjects were compli
mented for their performance during session one and given
positive verbal reinforcement after each problem they solved.

19

Experimental subjects showed a significant increase in intrin
sic motivation from session one to session three relative to
controls.

However, this difference was mostly attributable

to a decrease in puzzle working time by control subjects
(182.1 seconds) rather than any increase in puzzle working
behavior by experimental subjects

(who actually decreased

the amount of time spent on the puzzles by 4.7 seconds).
These results appear to provide somewhat ambiguous
evidence concerning the effect of verbal rewards on intrinsic
motivation.

Deci (19 72a) employed a more elaborate test of

the hypothesis using a variation of the original design to
supplement these early findings.
participated in only one session.

In this design, subjects
The first part of the

session was similar to the above experiment.

Subjects were

asked to reproduce configurations of the Soma puzzle.

How

ever, in the present design, the experimenter left the room
under the pretext of determining which questionnaire to give
to the subject based upon the subject's puzzle solving be
havior up to that point.

At this point, the subject was

observed by a second experimenter who the subject was unaware
of.

Rewards consisted of both verbal reinforcement and

money.1

A third variable, sex of the subject, helped to clarify

the results.

As in the first experiment, the presentation of

of monetary rewards significantly decreased intrinsic
■*Tn this study, Deci also tested the relationship be
tween inequity theory and cognitive evaluation theory by
varying the timing of the monetary reward.
These findings
will not be reviewed here.
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motivation.

It was also demonstrated that males who had

received verbal rewards demonstrated significantly more
intrinsic motivation than males who received no feedback.
However, females who had received verbal rewards showed less
intrinsic motivation than females who received no feedback,
although the difference was not significant.

The same pattern

of results was reported in the research of Deci et al.,
(1973).

Using the one session paradigm, positive verbal

feedback was given to males and females by both male and
female experimenters.

Female subjects who received positive

feedback spent significantly less free choice time working
on puzzles than female subjects who received no verbal feed
back regardless of the sex of the experimenter.

On the other

hand, positive feedback significantly increased the intrinsic
motivation of male subjects regardless of the sex of the
experimenter.
these

Deci attempted to integrate the results of

two studies into cognitive evaluation theory by

examining the traditional roles of males and females in our
society.

He argues that the female role is a more dependent

one and thus females may be more sensitive and dependent
on what people say.

As a result, females may have been more

dependent on the positive feedback from the experimenter and
thus reacted to it differently than males.

The controlling

aspect of the verbal reward may be more salient than the
informational aspect for females.

According to the theory,

this would result in a changed locus of causality and a reduc
tion in intrinsic motivation.

On the other hand, males are

21

probably less sensitive and dependent on this type of rein
forcement and were probably more in touch with the informa
tional aspect of the feedback.

This will result in increased

feelings of competence and hence, increased intrinsic
motivation.
In a related study, Anderson, Manoogian and Reznick
(1976)

asked four and five year old children to perform an

intrinsically motivating task (free-style drawing with multi
colored felt-tipped pens) while (a) expecting money,

(b)

expecting a good player reward, and (c) receiving positive
verbal reinforcement.

A pattern of results similar to the

above data was found, without the sex differences.

Subjects

in the money and reward condition displayed significantly
less intrinsic interest in the free play period when compared
with baseline data.

Intrinsic motivation increased for

verbally reinforced subjects.

Intrinsic motivation in control

groups where time and presence of the experimenter were
controlled did not change, although there was a significant
decline in intrinsic motivation in a third control group
where the child was ignored.

This may have resulted from

the generally aversive atmosphere of that condition.
Other support for this issue, although not as conclu
sive, can be deduced from the work of Dollinger and Thelen
(1978).
rewards

In their study, children who received tangible
(pretzels) showed less subsequent intrinsic motivation

than children in a control or verbal reward condition.
However, since control and verbally rewarded subjects did
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not differ from each other, Dollinger and Thelen could only
conclude that verbal rewards will not reduce intrinsic moti
vation, but not necessarily as Deci predicts, increase it.
Other research has focused on the effect of combining
verbal praise with a tangible reward.

In a study using a

drawing task similar to that used by Anderson et al., Swann
and Pittman (1977) found that verbal praise could eliminate
the effects of a reward.

Part of their study involved com

paring the intrinsic interest of elementary school aged
subjects given an external reward (a good player reward)
with those subjects who received the same reward plus verbal
praise.

During a free choice period, this latter group chose

the drawing activity significantly more often than did the
former group and spent more time with the drawing activity.
Thus, Swann and Pittman argued that the addition of a verbal
reward served to either neutralize the effects of the external
reward or that the verbal reward may have led the children to
focus on the informational rather than the controlling aspects
of the external reward and thus increased feelings of
competence.

Similar findings are reported in the disserta

tions of Gersh (1977) and Goldstein (1977).

In both of these

studies, a reward group which was also given verbal feedback
did not show a subsequent reduction in intrinsic motivation.
Thus, there is considerable evidence for the basic ele
ments of cognitive evaluation theory.

The studies reviewed

in this section demonstrated that the presence of a wide
variety of external rewards (money, food, and good player
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rewards) resulted in a decrease in intrinsic motivation in
both children and adults.

Although the evidence is not as

conclusive in both quantity and scope, it does appear that
the presence of negative feedback will reduce intrinsic
motivation while the presence of positive verbal feedback
will increase intrinsic motivation.

However, it is important

to note, that the increase in intrinsic motivation following
positive feedback, and its decrease following negative feed
back, may also be explained using traditional reinforcement
theory.

There is no

direct evidence that any of the changes

in behavior observed in the above studies, were due to changes
in feelings of competence or efficacy.

On the other hand,

there are a number of studies that have dealt more specifi
cally with the attributional processes which may underlie
changes in intrinsic motivation.

These studies will be re

viewed in the next section.
Processes of Attribution
The importance of attributional processes in cognitive
evaluation theory is highlighted in a study by Deci, Benware
and Landy (1974).

Subjects were read descriptions of an

experiment which the experimenter had claimed had been con
ducted during a previous semester.

The alleged experiment

involved a color perception task which required the "subjects"
(referred to as actors) to color some pictures.

Half the

subjects were told that these actors received $2.50 per hour
for performing the task, while the other half were told the
actors received 50 cents per hour.

Subjects attributed
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greater extrinsic motivation to actors who received higher
reward than to those who received the smaller reward, and
less intrinsic motivation to performers who received higher
rewards than to actors who received the smaller rewards.
There was also a negative relation between attributions of
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.

Thus, if attributions

of one type of motivation exist, then the tendency will be
to assume that the other type does not exist or exists at
lower levels.
This issue is also indirectly explored by Karniol and
Ross (1976).

They presented different aged subjects (kin

dergarten, first grade, second grade and college students)
four pairs of stories.

Each pair contained one story in

which a plausible external cause for a target person's be
havior was in the form of either a parental command or
promised reward and a corresponding story in which the
target person performed the same behavior of his own accord.
The dependent variable was the choice of either the con
strained or unconstrained target person as the one who most
liked the target activity.

The results indicated that

younger subjects were more likely to use an additive prin
ciple (i.e., tangible rewards and parental commands were
seen as increasing the target person's desire to play with
the toy) while older subjects basically used a discounting
principle (i.e., the presence of an external constraint was
seen as decreasing the target person's desire to play with
the toy).

But even among kindergarten children, 32.14%
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used a discounting model in their choice patterns when lis
tening to reward stories and 50% used this mode when listen
ing to command stories.

From grade one onward, a majority

of subjects tended to use the discounting model rather than
the additive one.

Thus it appears that even very young

children are capable of the attributional processes suggested
by Deci's cognitive evaluation theory or the overjustification hypothesis.
A study by Pittman, Cooper and Smith (1977) presents
even more direct evidence that an attributional effect may
mediate the reduction of intrinsic motivation observed after
the presentation of external rewards.

College students were

provided with attributional information that was designed
to either facilitate or inhibit an attribution shift.

While

playing with the target activity, subjects were wired to a
GSR meter which gave them feedback on their arousal level.
Some subjects were given feedback that their arousal pattern
indicated that they were interested in the game, thus sup
plying a cue which suggested an intrinsic attribution.

Other

subjects were given feedback that their arousal indicated
a pattern similar to people who "are starting to think about
the money they can win," thus supplying a cue which sug
gested an external attribution.

A third group of subjects was

given no feedback from the GSR meter.

In addition, half the

subjects were rewarded for playing with the task while half
weren't.

A Neumann-Keuls analysis indicated that the Reward-

No Cue subjects played with the task significantly less than
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the No Reward-No Cue subjects during the free choice period,
thus replicating the overjustification effect.

But more

importantly, Reward-Intrinsic Cue subjects played with the
game significantly more than Reward-No Cue subjects.

In

addition, Reward-External Cue subjects spent less time with
the game relative to Reward-No Cue subjects.

However, this

difference was not significant and hence any interpreta
tions based on it must remain only suggestive in nature.
However, the study did demonstrate very clearly that the
presence of an intrinsic attribution was able to inhibit the
overjustification effect.
Boundary Conditions of the Phenomenon
Since Deci's early research, a number of studies have
been performed which have refined and clarified his original
findings.

These studies have provided important information

concerning the boundary conditions of the phenomenon, i.e.,
under what conditions can we expect processes of cognitive
evaluation or the overjustification effect to take place.
These include parameters associated with the nature of the
reward and the nature of the task.

Each is discussed below.

Reward Variables
Expectancy.

The expectancy of the reward may be a

significant variable in qualifying some of the earlier re
sults.

In the study of Lepper et al.

(1973) cited earlier,

children who showed an initial interest in a drawing activity
during the baseline observations in their classroom were
brought to a separate room and asked to engage in the same
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drawing activity.

In the expected reward condition, sub

jects agreed to engage in the activity in order to obtain an
extrinsic reward.
ribbon.)

(A good player reward with a gold seal and

In the unexpected reward condition, subjects en

gaged in the same activity and received the same reward, but
had no knowledge they would receive it until after they fin
ished the activity.

In the no reward condition, subjects

neither expected nor received rewards.

Post experimental

observations were made seven to 14 days after the experi
mental condition in the classroom.

Subjects were unaware

that their behavior was being observed.

As in the Deci

studies, the amount of time the subjects spent on the acti
vity when they could do other interesting things was taken
as a measure of intrinsic motivation.

Cognitive evaluation

theory would predict that since it is more likely that sub
jects who expected to receive a reward for an activity would
perceive the reward as the cause of the activity, the
expected reward subjects should exhibit less intrinsic moti
vation during the free play session.
confirmed.

This hypothesis was

Subjects in the expected reward condition did

not spend as much subsequent free time on the activity as
unexpectedly rewarded or control subjects.

A post hoc test

comparing post experimental interest with original interest
within each treatment condition was also performed.

Subjects

in both the unexpected and control conditions showed very
slight and

nonsignificant increases in interest from pre to

post experiment measurement sessions.

On the other hand,
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subjects in the expected reward condition manifested a sig
nificant decrease in interest from baseline to postexperimental sessions.
However, Kruglanski et al.
of the above findings.

(1972) have disputed some

They asked two groups of elementary

school children to participate in games against each other.
In one half of the winning teams the members received at
tractive prizes as tokens of their victory, although no
prize had been promised initially.
tributed to the control subjects.

No prizes were dis
Each subject then

responded to a questionnaire which included their attri
buted cause for participating in the games and their enjoy
ment thereof.

These questionnaires were filled out imme

diately following the experimental session and one week
later.

Subjects who received the rewards (although

unexpected), attributed causality for having participated
in the games to the prizes and reported significantly less
enjoyment of the game with little change one week later.
Kruglanski et al. argued that the introduction of an unex
pected reward may result in the subject retrospectively
attributing the cause of his behavior.

These results do

conflict with the findings of Lepper et al.

However, it

should be noted that different measures of intrinsic moti
vation were used in the two studies.

Also, Kruglanski et

al. used a different population of subjects, who because of
their age, might have been more capable of making retro
spective attributions that preschoolers cannot.

In any case,
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it appears that the expectancy of rewards is not a necessary
precondition for the cognitive evaluation or overjustification effect to occur.

Instead, expectancy may just increase

the causal link between the reward and behavior and therefore
facilitate the undermining effect of rewards on subsequent
intrinsic motivation.
Contingency of reward.

Another important reward vari

able which has received considerable attention in the litera
ture is the contingency of the reward.

Although definitions

of contingency of reward have at times been ambiguous,
Deci's original operations included those situations where
the subject was rewarded based on some performance criteria.
Fisher (1978) maintains that these type of contingent
rewards may be more controlling than non-contingent rewards
since being paid contingently should tend to continuously
control the level at which one performs.

Non-contingent

rewards on the other hand, merely control the decision to
engage in the task and do not influence the level on which
one performs from minute to minute.

In a study by Deci,

(1972b), one half of the subjects were paid non-contingently
for performing the Soma task.

Each subject in this condition

received two dollars for participating in the study at the
end of the experiment regardless of how well he performed on
the task.

No significant differences in intrinsic motiva

tion between this and the control group were found.

Thus,

there is some support for the contingency hypothesis.
However, as Calder and Staw (1975) indicate) Deci has done
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nothing but affirm the null hypothesis which does not allow
for the above conclusions.

Deci does, make the results more

meaningful by comparing them with two cells from an earlier
study in which subjects were paid contingently (Deci,
1972a).

The two experiments were virtually identical in all

other respects with average earnings in the contingent pay
ment study being $2.38 per subject.

Deci argues that it is

unlikely that an average difference of 38 cents would
affect the results, thus making the contingency of the reward
the critical variable.

There were clear differences in the

pattern of results for the two experiments.

When payment

was made contingent upon performance the subject's intrinsic
motivation decreased relative to the control group, whereas
when payment was not contingent upon performance, intrinsic
motivation did not decrease.

Data from Swann and Pittman's

(1977) study cited earlier also supports Deci's contention.
In their study, task non-contingent and control subjects
chose the drawing task significantly more often than task
contingent subjects.
On the other hand, several investigations call this con
tingency 'hypothesis into question.

For example, in a number

of studies (Kruglanski et al., 1971; Lepper et al., 1973),
the presentation of a non-contingent reward still resulted
in a decrease in intrinsic motivation.

Condry (1977) has

reviewed a number of studies investigating the contingency
hypothesis and argues that one difficulty in interpreting
the contradictory findings is that researchers often use
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the same word to describe different events.

For example,

"contingency" in Deci's (1972a), study referred to payment
contingent on successfully completing an item.

In Swann

and Pittman's (1977) study, this same term was used to
describe payment contingent on simply playing with the target
activity, that is, there were no performance criteria.

The

term "non-contingency" has also suffered from this same
confusing definitional problem.

In Deci (1972b), non

contingency referred to rewards that were unrelated to the
task (i.e., paying subjects for simply participating in the
task).

In the work of Lepper et al.

(1973), non-contingency

referred to rewards for doing the task but not explicitly
tied to a specific performance criteria.

Finally, non

contingency in Swann and Pittman's (1977) study referred to
rewarding subjects for simply waiting in the experimental
room for five minutes.
There may be some clarity in this empirical and concep
tual impasse in the work of Ross and his associates (Karniol
& Ross, 1977; Enzle & Ross, 1978).

Their research indicated

that the relevant variable may not be so much the contin
gency of,the reward, but the fact that this contingency
informs the subject about his or her competence in the task.
In their studies two types of contingent rewards were used.
In one type, the reward was made contingent on a certain
performance criteria, such that it provided feedback to the
subject that he or she was competent at the task.

In the

other type, the reward was made contingent on simply
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participating in the task.

In both studies, only this second

type of contingent reward reduced intrinsic motivation rela
tive to a control group.

In addition, performance contin

gent reward increased intrinsic motivation relative to
controls in the second study.
Considering these results the earlier contingency
findings can now be reinterpreted.

For example, in Deci's

(1972a) study, it is doubtful that paying subjects one dollar
contingent on successfully completing an item adds any more
information concerning competence beyond the subject's
knowledge that he or she got the item correct.

Thus, the

presence of this contingent reward decreased intrinsic moti
vation.

Similarly, since Swann and Pittman's (1977)

subjects were simply paid for playing with the task, the
reward provided no competency information and thus resulted
in a reduction of intrinsic motivation.

The same arguments

can be made for Deci (1972b), Kruglanski et al.
Lepper et al.

(1973).

(1971) and

Although these experimenters used

"non-contingent" rewards in their study, they resemble the
rewards used by Deci (1972a) and Swann and Pittman (1977) in
that they provided no competency information for the subject.
Thus, they too reduced intrinsic motivation.

However, in

the methodology of Ross and his associates, this reduction
in intrinsic motivation occured only in the task contingent
conditions.

In these conditions, like the ones just des

cribed, the presence of a reward did little to inform the
subject about his or her competence.

However, in the case
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of the performance contingent condition, the reward did
inform the subject that he or she was competent at the task,
and therefore, a reduction of intrinsic motivation was not
observed.

Thus, the issue of contingency of reward is a

complex one.

The term contingency may mean very different

psychological states for the subject depending on the speci
fic experimental operations used in a given study.
Norms of payment.

Staw, Calder and Hess (1980) argue

that the inhibitory effect of rewards on intrinsic motiva
tion depends upon the presence or absence of normative data
about whether a person ought to be paid for a specific task.
When a norm for payment exists, as opposed to when it
doesn't, money may be perceived as more of a part of the
task itself.

As a result, there may be no changes in attri

bution when the reward is presented and thus no decrease in
intrinsic motivation.

To test this hypothesis, Staw et al.

(1980) manipulated norms of payment by informing four inde
pendent sections of an Introduction to Organizational Behav
ior course that they would be expected to participate in a
laboratory experiment.

In two of the sections, students

were also told that researchers thought it appropriate for
students to be paid for their experimental participation,
thus creating a norm for payment.

Students in the remaining

two sections were told that students were not normally
paid for participating in laboratory experiments.

Subjects

were then randomly assigned to reward and no reward condi
tions when they took part in the experiment.

The task

consisted of jigsaw puzzles that were previously rated inter
esting.

Subject^ responses to an inventory measuring task

satisfaction served as the measure of intrinsic motivation.
A significant interaction indicated that the introduction of
an extrinsic reward decreased intrinsic motivation in the
target activity only in the condition where there did not
exist a norm for payment thus supporting the hypothesis.
Salience of reward.

Another reward variable which may

have important qualifying effects on processes of cognitive
evaluation or the overjustification effect is its salience.
Ross (1975) argues that the more salient the external reward
is, the more likely it is that the person will attend to it.
This will initiate the processes of attribution necessary to
reduce intrinsic motivation.

In the first of two experiments

testing this hypothesis, pre-schoolers were asked to play a
drum for either a salient reward (assorted candies), a non
salient reward or no reward.

The salient reward was placed

under a box in clear view of the subject.

In the non

salient reward condition, subjects were told they would re
ceive the candy at a later time.

In the control group,

subjects were not promised a reward.

The child's drum

playing was then measured during a free choice situation where
he/she could also choose from other toys.

Compared with

subjects in the non-salient reward condition, salient
subjects were less likely to engage immediately in the
target activity during the free play period.

In addition,

the duration of their performance was significantly reduced
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and they were less likely to report that the drum was the
best thing in the room to play with.

During a second free

choice period held one month later, the salience manipula
tion continued to influence duration of drum playing.
In the second experiment, Ross tested the generalizability of the initial results by using a different reward
and two different manipulations of salience.

In one (think-

reward condition), subjects were told they would receive
marshmellows as a prize and were asked to think of them while
playing the drum.

In the other,

(non-ideation condition),

subjects were promised the marshmellows but were asked not
to think about them.

In a distraction condition, subjects

were promised the marshmellows but asked to think about snow
(a three foot blizzard had just occured in the area).

The

purpose of this condition will be explored at a later point.
In the control condition, subjects were neither promised
nor given a reward.

Comparisons between treatment conditions

indicated that subjects in the control condition played the
drum significantly longer during the free period than sub
jects in the think-reward and the non-ideation condition.
The distraction condition also produced significantly more
drum playing than did the think-reward and non-ideation
conditions.

None of the remaining possible comparisons

attained significance.

These data clearly support the

findings of the first experiment.

In conditions where the

reward was salient (think-reward and non-ideation condition)
intrinsic motivation was reduced relative to the control
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group.

Although the salience of the reward was expected

to be higher in the think-reward condition when compared
with the non-ideation condition, the lack of difference
between these two conditions may indicate that subjects in
the former condition were thinking about the reward on their
own initiative.

More importantly, the distraction condition

yielded more interest in the target activity than did the
two salient conditions, presumably because it reduced the
tendency for subjects to think about the reward while play
ing with the drum, thus reducing the reward's salience.
A dissertation by Higgins

(1977) explores this issue of

salience in a more indirect fashion.

Using jigsaw puzzles

as the target activity, no significant differences were
found between rewarded and non rewarded subjects (second
grade students) during a free choice period.

Each subject

was then run through the experimental procedure a second
time, but this time the subjects who had originally been in
the reward condition now received no reward and those in
the no reward condition received a reward.

The measure of

intrinsic motivation now revealed a significant effect, with
rewarded subjects completing fewer puzzles during the second
free choice period.

Higgins argued that having the subjects

engage in the same task twice, once for reward and once for
no reward, made the presence or absence of a reward a more
salient variable.

Thus processes of attribution were assumed

to be more likely to occur rendering a decrease in intrinsic
motivation.
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Salience may be a very useful unifying concept for
integrating the various investigations concerned with reward
variables.

An argument can be made that expectancy, contin

gency and the normative nature of a reward are all features
of its salience.

It is a reasonable assumption that an

expected or contingent reward is more salient to a subject
than one which is unexpected or non-contingent.

In cases

where the reward is non-normative in nature, there is a
greater possibility that it will "stand out" or be more
salient to the subject.

In all these cases, attributional

processes predicted by cognitive evaluation or overjustification theories should occur more readily.
Task Variables
Task interest.

A number of studies have also investi

gated different types of task variables and their relationship
to cognitive evaluation theory or the overjustification
effect.

One which has received considerable attention is

task interest.

Calder and Staw (1975b) provide definitive

evidence that the overjustification effect depends upon the
initial interest in the task.

They argued that when a task

involves high intrinsic interest, the introduction of exter
nal rewards initiates the processes of self-perception
necessary for the overjustification effect to occur.

However,

when a task involves less intrinsic interest to begin with,
the presence of a reward simply acts as a reinforcer, result
ing in an increase in intrinsic motivation.

In their

study, male college students were asked to solve one of two
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sets of jigsaw puzzles identical in all respects except in
their interest value.

Subjects in the high interest task

condition worked on a set of puzzles made up of pictures pre
viously rated as interesting in a pilot study.

Subjects in

the low interest condition worked on puzzles made up of
blank sets.

To manipulate extrinsic rewards, half the sub

jects were promised one dollar for performing the task,
while for the other half, money was neither promised nor
given.

Intrinsic motivation was measured by the subject’s

response to an inventory measuring

task satisfaction.

A

significant interaction between reward and task interest
resulted.

An examination of cell means completely support

Calder and Staw's prediction.

When the task was initially

interesting, the introduction of rewards reduced intrinsic
motivation.

However, when the task was initially uninter

esting, the introduction of rewards increased intrinsic
motivation.
These results were replicated in the findings of McLoyd
(1979)

who used his subjects' initial choices of target

activities to establish initial interest, and Lonky (1978)
who used, a Piagetian scheme to classify his subject's initial
interest.

In both these investigations, the presence of

reward decreased intrinsic motivation only for those subjects
who initially engaged in an interesting task.

A disser

tation by Upton (1973) replicated these findings in
a field setting.

His results are particularly interesting

since they demonstrate the application of overjustification
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theory to more applied settings.

In Upton's study, subjects

were categorized as either having a high or low initial
interest in donating blood based on their actual recent
history of donations.

Recruitment letters were sent to

each of these subjects asking them to donate blood.

Half

of the letters offered a ten dollar remuneration for this
service, while the other half made no mention of payment.
The dependent measure of intrinsic motivation was the actual
number of people who showed up to donate blood.

A signif

icant interaction resulted which supported the hypothesis.
The presence of a reward as opposed to its absence resulted
in a significantly smaller proportion of initially interested
subjects actually donating their blood.

Although not sig

nificant this trend was reversed for subjects with low initial
interest.

The presence of reward as opposed to its absence

resulted in a larger proportion of these subjects actually
donating their blood.

Thus, the overjustification effect

was mediated by the subjects' initial interest in the task.
Task relationship to rewards.

In some cases, rewards

for a given task are inherent to the task content itself,
i.e., the reward is always associated with the content of the
task.

Kruglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shablai and

Zaksh (1975) hypothesized that in these cases, the presence
of a reward will increase intrinsic motivation since it will
result in the person's self-attributed reasons for perform
ing the task to be in its content as opposed to the external
consequences.

On the other hand, if the reward is extrinsic
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to the task content (or irrelevant), it should decrease in
trinsic motivation because it will result in the person's
self-attributed reason for performing the task to lie in
these consequences.

These researchers conducted two experi

ments using two types of tasks to test the hypothesis.

One

half of the subjects were assigned to a task intrinsic
reward condition (a "coin toss" game which is always played
for money in experiment 1, and a "stock market" game whose
essence revolves around monetary profit in experiment 2),
and a task extrinsic reward condition (a Soma type game in
experiment 1 and an athletic game in experiment 2,
of which was associated with payment).

neither

Half of the subjects

in each of the above conditions were paid according to their
performance.

For the other half, no mention of remuneration

was made throughout the experiment.

After the experimental

session, subjects responded to a questionnaire designed to
tap their interest in the task.

The results in both experi

ments supported the hypothesis.

In the task intrinsic reward

condition, the subjects manifested a significantly higher
degree of intrinsic motivation when payment was present as
opposed to when it was absent.

In the task extrinsic reward

conditions, the subject manifested a significantly lower
degree of intrinsic motivation when the money was present
rather than absent.

Both of these findings were found in

both experiments.
The results of Kruglanski et al.

(1975) can also be

interpreted with regard to the findings of Staw et al.

(1980)
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concerning norms of payment.

Rewards which are inherent to

a task's content fall into the domain of normative rewards,
while rewards which are extrinsic to the task's content are
non-normative.

As in the results of Staw et al., only the

non-normative rewards (i.e., task extrinsic rewards) reduced
intrinsic motivation.

However, as Staw et al. state, "It

is difficult outside of games with specific rules to know
when receiving money is or is not inherent in a task"

(p. 4).

Thus, the formulation of Kruglanski et al. "would not gener
ally provide a theory for predicting when the addition of
payment will inhibit

or enhance task attitude and persis

tence" (p. 5) .
Other Effects of External Rewards
The most direct and fundamental prediction of cognitive
evaluation theory and the overjustification hypothesis is
that external rewards will reduce intrinsic motivation.
However, some investigations have explored other detrimental
effects rewards may have on intrinsically motivating tasks
which are only indirectly implied from the basic theory.
For example, Amabile (1979) contends that an intrin
sically motivated state is conducive to creativity whereas
an extrinsically motivated state is detrimental.

In her

study, female subjects were asked to create collages out of
various materials.

Subjects were told to expect or to not

expect external evaluation of their work.

However, this

evaluation did not present any feedback to subjects concern
ing their performance.

In addition, a focus of evaluation

42

variable was also used in the study.

One-third of the sub

jects were told to focus on the technical aspects of the
activity, one-third the creative aspects, and one-third were
given no particular focus.

One-half of the technical group

was additionally told specifically which technical aspects
would be evaluated, and one-half of the creative focus group
were additionally told specifically which creative aspects
would be evaluated.

The data supported Amabile's hypothesis.

Each evaluation group except for one, was significantly
lower on rated creativity than its non-evaluative control.
The one exception was the evaluation group which had re
ceived explicit instructions on how to make the artwork
creative.

This "behavior modification" group (as Amabile

referred to it) was significantly higher on rated creativity
than its non-evaluative control.

Thus, Amabile demonstrated

that extrinsic rewards can cause a decrement in artistic
creativity, unless specific instructions are given to sub
jects on how to perform creatively.

Other results of

Amabile's study indicated that evaluative groups rated them
selves significantly less intrinsically interested in the task
than non-evaluative controls.
of Kruglanski et al.

Amabile's results mirror those

(1971), Lepper et al.

Loveland and Olley (1979).

(1973) and

In each of these studies, re

warded subjects produced less creative responses or poorer
quality products than subjects who did not receive rewards.
Garbarino (1975) has extended this issue to the realm
of social interaction, specifically in the way a reward can

43

affect the interactive style of an older child acting as a
tutor for a younger one.

Older children (grades 5 and 6)

acted as tutors for first and second graders by teaching
them a matching coding task.

In the reward condition, the

tutors were promised movie tickets for successfully teaching
the task, while in the no reward condition, no such promise
was made.

It was expected that "the effect of the antici

pated reward (would) organize the subject's behavior and
motivation around the goal of receiving the reward - to the
exclusion of interest in the intrinsic features of the task"
(p. 421).

The younger child's errors would be seen as an

obstacle to the reward desired by the older child.

It was

predicted that the older child's resentment would cast a
negative tone to the social interaction.
supported this hypothesis.

The results

There was significantly more use

of criticism and demands, and significantly less efficient
use of time in the reward condition.

The no reward condition

was marked by a more positive emotional tone, greater
learning by the younger child and fewer errors.

CHAPTER III
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The studies reviewed so far have focused primarily on
the introduction of concrete rewards to intrinsically inter
esting activities

(e.g., money, Deci, 1971, 1972a; Kruglanski

et al., 1975; prizes, Kruglanski et al., 1972; special acti
vities, Kruglanski et al., 1971; good player rewards, Lepper
et al., 1973; food, Ross, 1975).

Recent studies have ex

tended the problem to include other types of external con
straints.

These variables are less tangible than some of

the above rewards, but the more abstract external pressure
they exert has also been shown to reduce intrinsic motivation.
Lepper and Greene (1975) investigated the effect of
surveillance on children’s intrinsic motivation.

Pre

schoolers were brought into a room and asked to perform a
puzzle task which pretesting had suggested
intrinsic interest.

was of high

In the expected reward condition, sub

jects were promised the opportunity to play with a collection
of highly attractive toys, whereas in the unexpected reward
condition toys were not mentioned.

Orthogonally, .subjects

in the surveillance condition were told that a T.V. camera
would be recording their activity whenever a red light was
on.

In the high surveillance condition the red light was

on for four of the puzzles that the subject worked on.

In

the low surveillance condition, the red light was on for one
44

45

of the puzzles the subjects worked on.

For the non surveil

lance condition, no mention of the camera was made.
this period, all subjects were given the reward.

Following

Post

experimental observations were made in the classes one to
three weeks after the completion of the individual session.
There were no significant differences between high and low
surveillance, and, therefore, these two treatments were
collapsed into a single condition for purpose of analysis.
Significant main effects were found for both reward and sur
veillance, with no interactions between the variables.

As

in previous studies, expectation of a reward was sufficient
to produce significant decreases in intrinsic motivation.
Of more importance to the current issue, the less tangible
external variable of surveillance produced the same signifi
cant pattern of results.
Amabile, DeJong, and Lepper (1976) investigated another
non-tangible external variable that also appears to reduce
intrinsic motivation:

a deadline.

These authors hypothesized

that like money or surveillance, a deadline may cause sub
jects to view themselves as extrinsically motivated.

College

students were asked to play a game which involved forming
crosswords using 13 letters.
of four conditions.

Subjects were assigned to one

In the no deadline condition, subjects

were simply told to play with the crossword game as much
as they wished.

In the implicit deadline condition, sub

jects were told to work as fast as they could but would
have 15 minutes to work at this task, a time period which
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had proven sufficient for most subjects.

Subjects in the

explicit deadline condition received.instructions identical
to those for the implicit deadline condition.

In addition,

they were told that they had to complete the games within
the time period in order for their data to be useful.

In

a work-fast condition, subjects were asked to work as fast
as they could on the puzzles.

This condition was used to

test the possibility that the presence of a deadline might
cause an individual to feel pressured to work faster re
sulting in more fatigue or satiation with the task which might
also reduce intrinsic motivation.

If the performance of

subjects in this condition during the first part of the
experiment did not differ from that of subjects in the two
deadline conditions, their failure to show a similar decre
ment in intrinsic motivation during the free choice period
would rule out this alternative hypothesis as an adequate
account for lessened interest.

To establish a free choice

period, subjects were escorted to another room under the
pretense of a scheduling constraint.

Their behavior was

then observed through a one-way mirror.

In addition,

subjects were also asked to fill out a questionnaire con
cerning their interest in the task.

A planned contrast

comparing the two deadline conditions and the two non
deadline conditions for the free choice time was significant
and in the predicted direction, although there were no
significant differences between the two deadline conditions.
The same significant pattern of results was found for the

47

attitudinal measures.

Finally, there were no performance

differences between the work-fast condition and the two
deadline conditions during the first part of the study.
Since subjects in the work-fast condition did not show a
decrement in intrinsic motivation during the free choice
period, the alternative hypothesis of fatigue or satiation
was ruled out as a determining factor.
Swann and Pittman (1977) have extended the generality
of these findings by assessing the effect of another type
of external contraint on intrinsic motivation in children,
the limitation of freedom of choosing an activity by an
adult leader.

Subjects were either given the choice to play

with a drawing activity or told by an experimenter that he
had to start with the same activity.

Subjects in both groups

were positioned such that even in the child-choice condition,
the drawing activity would be the first choice.

During a

free play activity, subjects in the child-choice condition
chose the target activity first significantly more often
than did subjects in the adult choice condition.
Finally, Mossholder (1978) tested the hypothesis that
assigning an externally mediated goal could also reduce
intrinsic motivation.

Under such conditions, Mossholder

argued the task is being undertaken to attain a specific
external end:

the goal.

Thus the task may have become

valued largely for its instrumentality in reaching the goal
and not for its intrinsic interest.
Amabile et al.

Indeed, the findings of

(1976) may be reinterpreted in terms of this
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context.

The time deadline may have been viewed by the sub

jects as a particular form of a goal.

Mossholder also

argued however, that if the goal infuses some challenge into
the task, it may increase intrinsic motivation.

This is most

likely to occur when the task is boring, since it will be
devoid of interest to begin with.

The goal would therefore

provide some element of interest in the task.

To test this

hypothesis, Mossholder had college students work on two
types of tasks.

In the interesting task, nuts and bolts

from an erector set could be connected to form an asymetrical "erectocar."

In the boring task, subjects were

required to join one type of the erector set parts into
pairs using three nuts and three bolts.

For both task

conditions, subjects in the no-goal condition were instructed
to proceed at their own pace.

For subjects in the goal as

signed condition, separate goals were established for each
of the segments worked on.

Using free choice time and atti-

tudinal responses as dependent measures, a MANOVA revealed
a significant interaction.
dicted direction.

All differences were in the pre

The presence of a goal significantly

decreased intrinsic motivation for subjects performing the
interesting task for the behavioral and attitudinal mea
sures.

On the other hand, intrinsic motivation for the

boring task significantly increased, but only for the
attitudinal measure.
In summary, these four studies indicate that it is the
perception of an external constraint itself, rather than the
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particular form or content of the constraint which may ac
count for the cognitive evaluation effect (Amabile et al,,
1976).

The present research will investigate another

external constraint that may produce the cognitive evalua
tion or overjustification effect:

competition.

Clearly,

provoking a competitive state is quite different than offer
ing a tangible reward for engaging in a task.

However,

there is one underlying similarity between the two con
straints, a similarity that is reflected in all the research
associated with Deci's paradigm.

In both cases, it can be

said that the individual undertakes the task as a means to
accomplish a specific end.

In one case, the end is re

ceiving the reward; in the other, it is defeating his or her
opponent in a competitive struggle.

Supporters of cognitive

evaluation theory would speculate that in both cases, the
person will attribute his or her behavior to the extrinsic
pressure in the situation, rather than seeing himself/
herself as enjoying the activity for its own sake.

As a

result, the person's subsequent intrinsic interest in the
activity will be expected to decrease.
To test this hypothesis, subjects in the present study
were randomly assigned to conditions of Competition or No
Competition.

In addition, the Competition variable was

crossed with a Reward variable to allow the present study to
be interpreted within the context of past research.
A methodology similar to ones used in the literature
was employed for the present study.

Soma was chosen for the
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target activity since Deci has demonstrated its interest for
college students.

A salient, expected, contingent and non-

normative reward of money was chosen for the external reward.
In addition, the reward did not provide any information
concerning competence at performing the task above and beyond
the subject's knowledge that he successfully completed each
item.

It was decided that after being exposed to the experi

mental manipulations, subjects would be unobtrusively ob
served during a free choice period.

Additionally, it was

decided that interest measures using a questionnaire would
be taken.
Main effects for Reward and Competition were predicted
such that Rewarded subjects would show larger decrements
of intrinsic motivation relative to No Reward subjects and
Competitive subjects would show larger decrements of intrin
sic motivation relative to Non-Competitive subjects.

Based

on the methodology of the study, it is difficult to predict
what may be the result of a combination of the two indepen
dent variables.

Intuitively, it would be expected that sub

jects in the Competition-Reward condition should show the
least intrinsic interest, since this condition contains the
most salient external cues.

However, it is possible that

the two external constraints might provide "redundant" infor
mation in terms of external constraint.

Therefore, the

combination of the two constraints might not produce more
"cue value" than each constraint separately.

CHAPTER IV
METHOD
Subjects and Design
Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of New
Hampshire took part in the study.

All participated for

about one hour to partially fulfill an introductory course
requirement.

A two by two factorial design was employed,

with two levels of Reward (Reward and No Reward) and two
levels of Competition (Competition and No Competition).
Pairs of subjects were randomly assigned to the four cells
of the design, with eight pairs per cell.

Since subjects

were tested in pairs, it was decided to use only one sex.
Males were chosen, since it was expected that they would
more likely respond to competitive instructions than females.
Task
All subjects worked with the task called Soma, distri
buted by Parker Brothers.

The task required the subjects to

reproduce two dimensional pictures with three dimensional
pieces.

There were seven of these pieces.

Each piece was

shaped differently and looked as though it were made of three
or four one inch cubes.

The seven pieces could be arranged

into millions of configurations.

All items used in the

experimental and free choice periods of the study were
identical with those used by Deci in his earlier research.
(.For a sample item and its solution, see Figures 1 & 2.)
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FIGURE 1
Sample Item from the Soma Task
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The Solution for the Item in Figure 1
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Procedure
Pairs of subjects were escorted into two adjoining rooms
by the experimenter.

On a desk before him, each subject

found the following items:

a set of earphones through which

all instructions were given, a booklet containing four pro
blems he was going to work on, a sample problem, solutions
to the problems, and a set of Soma cubes.

The booklet also

contained a page with a subject identification number writ
ten on it.

Since for both subjects the number "2" was

written on this page, each subject was under the impression
that he was Subject #2, and the other subject was Subject #1.
The reason for this deception will be explained at a later
point.

To the side of each subject, were current issues of

three magazines.
Yorker.)

(Newsweek, Sports Illustrated and the New

Under the magazines were two other problems for

the Soma task.

Both these problems were impossible to solve.

Both subjects were positioned in front of a one way mirror so
that the experimenter could observe them from a third room.
The subjects knew that the experimenter would be observing
them for the first part of the experiment.
All subjects worked on four Soma problems after prac
ticing with a sample.
per problem.

Each subject was allowed six minutes

Pilot data had indicated that if a subject

could not solve a problem within six minutes, it was unlikely
he would solve it within a reasonable time frame.

When

the full six minutes had elapsed, subjects were instructed
to look at the solution to the problem they were working on.
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Since any subject who was unable to do a configuration
during the six minute time limit was shown its solution,
the possibility that the Zeigarnik (1927) effect would in
fluence the subjects behavior during the free choice period
was reduced.
During this part of the experiment, the time to com
plete each problem was measured with a stopwatch.

If a

subject did not complete the task within six minutes, his
time was recorded as six minutes.
correct was also recorded.

The number of items

In addition, while working on

the task, each subject listened to music through their
earphones.
Instructions for this part of the experiment were as
follows:
If you can hear me, please raise your hand.
O.K.,
welcome to experiment number one. You may have
some friends, or you yourself may like to study
with some kind of music on.
During this study,
I will be exploring the effects of music on
various performance skills under different condi
tions. Therefore, it is important that you keep
these earphones on throughout the experiment,
since you will each be hearing the music through
them.
Please don't take them off until I tell
you to. Here is a sample of the music you will
be hearing.
(A short fifteen second segment was
played at this point.)
If you heard that, please
raise your hand.
O.K., if you look to the right
on the desk in front of you, you will see a blue
booklet.
Please open it to the first page only.
The first page has a number written on it. That
is how I will refer to you during this experiment.
Subject number one, please raise your hand.
(after a short pause)
Subject number two, please
raise your hand.
Subjects in the Competition conditions were given
verbal instructions that stressed the competitive nature of
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the task.

They were told that the other subject was work

ing on the same problem and that the experimenter was going
to compare their performances to see who did better.

Sub

jects in the No Competition conditions were told that the
other subject was working on a different problem.

Using

the above operations, the variable "Competition - No
Competition" needs some clarification.

The operational

definition for No Competition includes only those situations
where the subjects are performing simultaneously on the same
task.

There are other types of non-competitive situations

(for example, where subjects perform on different tasks).
Therefore, the variable "No Competition" in the present
study is just one type of non-competitive situation and
should not be thought of as the "prototypical" No Competi
tion condition.

In the present study, No Competition is

defined more by what is absent (competition), than what is
present.1
Instructions for subjects in the Competition conditions
were as follows:
During the first part of the experiment I will
be able to observe you through the one-way mirror.
I am going to ask each of you to take part in
Initially, subjects in the Competitive conditions were
given feedback of how their performance compared to the other
member of their pair.
They were told that on one item they
had done better, on one item they had done worse, and on
two items they had done equally well as the other subject.
This was done to increase the impact of the Competition
variable. However, this did not prove to be any more effec
tive than the Competition variable eventually used in the
present study, so rather than compromise the Competition
manipulation by having to qualify it, feedback was not used.
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the same problem solving task. You will see the
materials for this task in a box to your left.
Please take it out now. The object of this
task is to reproduce two dimensional pictures
with three dimensional blocks. You may use
anywhere from two to all seven blocks for any
puzzle.
In the blue booklet, on the page follow
ing your subject number, you will each find a
sample problem and its solution.
I'd like you
to study the sample for about a minute and prac
tice reproducing the picture with the blocks,
but please, when you each work on the task,
try to keep all the materials on the black
cushioned surface since I don't want the pieces
to get scratched by the table.
O.K., take about
a minute and do that now.
(The subjects were
allowed five minutes to work with the sample.
If they couldn't solve the problem, the experi
menter helped them out.)
O.K., if you have any questions at this point,
please raise your hand. Both of you will be
working on the same problem task.
Performance
on this task has been shown to be a good indi
cator of a person's problem solving ability.
The reason why there are two of you is that I
want to compare the results you both make at a
later point to see who did better.
Instructions for subjects in the No Competition condi
tions were as follows:
During the first part of the experiment I will
be able to observe you through the one-way
mirror.
I am going to ask each of you to take
part in two different tasks, each measuring a
different ability related to human behavior.
You will see the materials for this task in a
box to your left.
Please take it out now.
Subject number one, the object of your task is
to form crosswords from the letters facing up
on the set of thirteen blocks.
You may use
anywhere from five to all thirteen blocks for
any item.
Subject number two, the object of •
your task is to reproduce two dimensional pic
tures with the three dimensional blocks.
You
may use anywhere from two to all seven blocks
for any puzzle.
In the blue booklet, on the
page following your subject number, you will
each find a sample problem and its solution.
I'd like you to study the sample for about a
minute. Subject number one, why don't you
study the different words and practice repro
ducing them with the blocks.
Subject number
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two, why don't you practice reproducing the pic
tures with the blocks, but please, when you
each work on the task, try to keep all the mater
ials on the black cushioned surface since I
don't want the pieces to get scratched by the
table.
O.K., take about a minute and do that
now.
(The subjects were allowed five minutes to
work with the sample.
If they couldn't solve
the problem, the experimenter helped them out.)
O.K., if you have any questions at this point,
please raise your hand.
The tasks each of you
will be working on each measure different abil
ities.
Subject number one, your task has been
shown to be a good measure of vocabulary ac
quisition.
Subject number two, your task has
been shown to be a good measure of problem
solving ability.
Performance on one is inde
pendent of performance on the other, so there
is no way I can compare your performance.
Each subject in the Reward conditions was told he could
earn 50 cents for each item successfully completed.

The

money was plainly in view for subjects in a small box to
his left.The subjects were allowed to
after successfully completing

the item.

take the money
No such reward

instructions were given in the No Reward conditions.1
Instructions for subjects in the Reward conditions
were as follows:
Normally, students are not paid to take part in
these experiments since they receive academic
credit. However, I will be able to pay you 50
cents per item as an incentive for doing the
task
if you get the item correct. Based on my
past
experience, this 50 cents per item seems
like a fair price for participating in this
study with this task.
You will see the money,
in a small box to your left. After each item
Initially, subjects in the Reward condition were
given 50 cents per item independent of successfully com
pleting it. However, this produced no differences among
pilot subjects on the dependent measure.
Therefore, the
current methodology was chosen since it was closer to
the methodology used by Deci in his earlier research.
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is finished, and if you get it right, you may
take one fifty cent piece for doing the task.
After receiving instructions which established the
condition that the subject was it, he was given the follow
ing instructions with regard to the task.
In the blue booklet that contained the sample
are also the four items that I would like you
to work on.
Following each item is its solu
tion. You will have about six minutes to work
on each item.
I will tell you when the time is
up. If you finish early, please remain seated
and do not handle any of the other materials.
This may happen since I will wait the full six
minutes before going on to the next item. When
the time is up, I would like you to look at the
solution for the item you just worked on and
reproduce it if you haven't done so already.
But don't go on to the next item or handle any
of the other material until I tell you to.
Do you, subject number one or subject number
two, have any questions? If you do, raise your
hand and I '11 come to answer them.
Subjects were then reminded of the various contingen
cies.

Rewarded subjects were told:
Remember now, you can get 50 cents per item
for performing the task.
Competition subjects were told:
Remember now, I will be comparing your perfor
mances to see who did better.
After six minutes had passed, subjects were told the

following:
O.K., time is up. Please check over the solution
for the item you just worked on and reproduce
it if you haven't done so already.
(Competition
subjects were additionally told: Meanwhile,
I will record each of your performances to com
pare them.
Reward subjects who successfully
completed the item were additionally told:
You may take the 50 cents now.)
After all four items were completed, Reward subjects
were told:
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O.K., the money you received for performing
the task is yours to keep.
A free choice period was established by creating the
impression that the experimenter was interviewing one of
the subjects.

After finishing the last Soma problem, the

experimenter told each subject that he was going to inter
view Subject #1 about the experiment.

Since both subjects

thought that they were Subject #2 and the other was Subject
#1, each subject believed he was not observed during this
period.

In reality, the experimenter remained in his

room and observed both subjects during this period.

Pilot

subjects indicated that this cover story was not believable.
Since the subjects' rooms were so close together, each sub
ject could hear the other playing the Soma task.
they expected to also hear the "interview."
couldn't, they suspected a deception.

Therefore,

When they

To prevent these

suspicions from occuring, a method was needed to mask any
extraneous sounds.

Therefore, subjects were initially

told that the experiment was one on the effects of music
on problem solving ability.

Throughout the experiment when

instructions weren't given, low key "muzak-type" music was
played through the earphones.

At the same time that the

experimenter told the subject he was "interviewing" the
"other" subject, a tape recording of a dummy interview was
played from the experimenter's room.

Responses of pilot

subjects indicated that this deception was quite effective.
Additionally, during a post experimental interview, subjects
reported that the music did not interfere with their work
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on the Soma task.

Subjects were told that while the "inter

view" was taking place, they could read some of the magazines
left near them, or continue working on their problems using
some extra items left on the desk from a previous study.
These items were impossible to solve so that if the subject
stopped playing with them it could not be attributed to his
solving the problem.
Instructions for the free choice period were as follows:
0.K., for the next part of the experiment, I'm
going to ask each of you to do something differ
ent.
First I'm going to interview subject number
1 about the effects of the music.
Subject number
1, I'll be in your room in a moment.
Subject
number 2, I'll be with you after I've finished
to ask you to fill out a questionnaire.
While
you're waiting please feel free to relax and do
whatever you want to in the room. You may want
to read some of the magazines I've left near
you on the table. There are also some other
pictures of the puzzles you've just worked on
that I've used in past studies that you might
want to try. They're underneath the pile of
magazines.
(For subjects in the reward condition
only: However, I won't be able to pay you for
those.)
Or if you want, you can just sit here
and wait while I interview tljie other subject.
I
should be about ten minutes.
The free choice period lasted ten and a half minutes.
During that period the experimenter recorded how often each
subject played with the Soma task with the use of a two
Different instructions for the free choice period were
initially used in which the subject was not told about the
opportunity to continue to play with the extra samples.
Instead, they were left on the table in clear view of the
subject. However, since this produced such a small amount
of play with the Soma task during the free choice period in
all conditions, the final methodology included a verbal
reference to the sample.
This methodology is similar to
those of Amabile et al., 1976; Anderson et a l . , 1976; Deci,
1971; Kruglanski et al., 1975; Ross, 1975; Ross et al.,
1976.
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channel event recorder.

This was operationalized by the

subject manipulating the blocks in a way that attempted to
reproduce the extra items.

Additionally, if the subject

examined the extra items in a studious fashion, this too
was considered a measure of intrinsic motivation.
member of each pair of subjects was videotaped.

One
This tape

was observed by an independent observer who was unaware of
the subject's condition.

His observation served as a

reliability test of the dependent measure.
After the ten and one half minutes had passed, each
subject was asked to fill out two inventories measuring
their intrinsic motivation for the task.1
and B for a copy of these scales.)

(See Appendix A

The first inventory

asked subjects to rate 12 items on a seven point bipolar
scale.

Seven of these items were measures of intrinsic

motivation,while four were distractor items.

The second

inventory asked subjects to rate the extent they agreed
or disagreed with eight statements on a seven point
Initially, there was an attempt to test the generalizability of the overjustification effect.
To do this,
before filling out any of the inventories, subjects were
given the opportunity to read a Scientific American article
which dealt with the Soma game. They then rated their
interest' in the article and took a short quiz on the article.
It was hypothesized that if the overjustification' effect is
generalizable, subjects performance in the Reward and Com
petition conditions would be worse on the quiz than the
performance of subjects in the No Reward and Competition
conditions respectively.
Additionally, Reward and Competi
tion subjects were expected to express less interest in
the article.
Since no differences were exhibited by the
pilot subjects, this manipulation was dropped from the
experiment.
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bipolar scale.

Five of these items measured intrinsic moti

vation, while three were distractor items.
It was also possible that the subject's behavior on the
dependent measures may have been a function of being observed
by the experimenter, or by the six minute time limit during
the first part of the experiment.

To test for these possi

bilities, subjects were asked to rate on a seven point
bipolar scale these self-perceptions.
copy of these scales.)

(See Appendix C for a

As a manipulation check, subjects

were then asked to rate how competitive they felt during the
experiment on a seven point bipolar scale.

(For a copy of

this scale, see Appendix D.)
After filling out the various inventories and scales,
a post experimental interview was used to determine if any
of the subjects suspected any of the manipulations.

(See

Appendix E for a copy of the questions asked during this
interview.)

After the interview, subjects were debriefed

and asked not to discuss the study with any of their friends
or fellow students.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
Subjects Dropped From the Design
Two subjects were dropped from each cell based on their
responses to the post experimental interview.

In the No

Reward-No Competition condition, two subjects reported that
they were being observed during the free choice period and
also correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study.

One of

these subjects also reported that he and the other subject
were working on the same task during the experiment even
though the experimenter had stated otherwise.

In the No

Reward-Competition condition, one subject registered for the
experiment twice (he was originally used as a pilot subject),
while another subject stated that he felt that he was being
observed during the free choice period and also correctly
guessed the hypothesis of the study.

In the Reward-No

Competition condition, one subject indicated that he believed
that he would not be allowed to keep the money, refused to
keep the money, reported he felt that he was being observed
during t!he free choice period and correctly guessed the
hypothesis of the study.

A second subject in this condition

reported that he felt he was being observed during the free
choice period and correctly guessed the hypothesis of the
study.

Finally, two subjects in the Reward-Competition

condition correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study and
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reported that they felt they were being observed during the
free choice period.

Additionally, one of these subjects

reported that he believed he would not keep the money, felt
that the extra samples were impossible to do and stated that
the music interfered with his performance.

All of the anal

yses of the data was done with these subjects dropped from
the study, leaving 56 in total, fourteen in each cell.
Reliability Data
Reliability data proved to be highly significant.
Correlations between observations made during the free
choice period and from the video tape yielded a Pearson r
of .999.

However, there was the possibility that since many

of the subjects did not play with the Soma task during the
free choice period (a fact which will be explored later),
these reliability scores were inflated.

A second relia

bility check which excluded whese subjects still yielded an
extremely high correlation (r = .996), thus ruling out this
possibility.
Analyses Ruling Out Alternative Hypotheses3Separate ANOVAs were performed on the amount of time
subjects needed to complete each of the four items of the
Soma task as well as on the sum of these four times during
the first part of the experiment (i.e., before the free
choice period).

An ANOVA was also performed on the number

of correct items obtained by the subjects during that period.
^For all analyses, unless otherwise stated, only signif
icant levels of .10 are reported.
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None of these analyses were significant indicating that
there were no performance differences among subjects as a
result of being in different experimental conditions.1
These findings replicate those reported by Deci (1975) ,
Karniol and Ross (1976), Kruglanski et al. (1972) and Ross
(1975).

Thus it is very unlikely that responses on any of

the dependent measures were mediated by performance differ
ences during the first part of the experiment.
Separate ANOVAs were also performed on each of the two
scales which measured the extent to which the subjects
rated the presence of a time limit and being observed by
the experimenter during the first part of the experiment
as affecting their behavior.
In both cases, null findings
2
resulted.
Thus, it is unlikely that either of these two
variables can account for differences on any of the depen
dent measures.
Manipulation Check
A significant main effect, F (1, 52) = 25.418,
£ = .0001, for Competition was found for the subjects'
ratings of their felt competitiveness.

For the seven point

scale, the mean rating for subjects in the Competition condi
tion was 3.500 while the No Competition subjects the mean was
5.714.

Thus, the manipulation check indicated that competi

tive instructions instilled greater feelings of competition
■^For all but one of these analyses, £ > .30.
For the one
exception (the main effect for competition on the first Soma
item) , £ > .10.
2
For all of these analyses, £ > .20.
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for subjects than those who did not receive these instruc
tions.
Analyses of the Dependent Measures
Inventory Items
A MANOVA was performed using all of the inventory items
measuring intrinsic motivation employing a two (Reward) by
two (Competition) design.

Findings for responses to the

inventories will be reported in the following way.

For the

first inventory, where subjects were asked to respond to a
seven point bipolar scale, the key word which expresses
intrinsic motivation will be used to represent that continum.

For example, for the continum "Interesting-Boring,"

"Interesting" will be used.

For the second inventory,

where subjects were asked to rate on a seven point bipolar
scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a
statement about their interest in the task, the key word
which expresses intrinsic motivation will be used preceded
by the word "Agree."

For example, for the item, "I felt the

task was interesting," "Agree Interesting" will be used.
The results of the MANOVA failed to reach statistical
significance.

In spite of these findings an ANOVA was

performed on all the inventory items measuring intrinsic
motivation.

However, caution should be taken in making

inferences from this univariate data because of the lack of
positive multivariate findings.
A significant main effect for Reward was found for
"Interesting," F (1, 52) = 6.5332, £ = .003.

However, the
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results were in the opposite direction from those predicted.
Rewarded subjects rated the task as more interesting than did
subjects in the No Reward condition.
A significant main effect for Competition was found for
"Creative," F (1, 52) = 3.11, £ = .084 which indicated that
subjects in the No Competition condition rated the task as
more creative than those in the Competition condition.
However, these results must be qualified since a significant
Reward by Competition interaction was also found, F (1, 52) =
5.530, £ = .023).

A protected t (Fisher LSD test)^

indi

cated that No Reward-Competition subjects rated the task as
less creative than did subjects in any of the other conditions.
A significant main effect for Reward was found for
"Agree Gift," F (1, 52) = 4.0392, £ = .05.

Again, results

were in the opposite direction from those predicted.

Sub

jects in the Reward condition rated themselves as more
likely to buy the task as a gift for a friend than did sub
jects in the No Reward condition.

However, a significant

Reward by Competition interaction was also found, F (1, 52) =
4.039, £ =

.05, which indicated that subjects in the No

Reward-Competition condition rated themselves as less likely
to buy the task as a gift for a friend than did subjects in
any of the other conditions.
A significant Reward by Competition interaction was
found for "Agree Inward Desire," F (1, 52) = 3.891,
■^For all protected t tests reported in this study a
.10 significance level was chosen to test differences among
the cell means.
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£ = .054, which indicated that subjects in the No RewardCompetition condition rated themselves as less motivated
by inward desire to choose the task than subjects in the
Reward-Competition and No Reward-No Competition conditions.
In addition, responses to all 12 items were summed and
averaged to obtain a summary term for both inventories.
This item was referred to as "Sumscale."

An argument could

be made, that the validity of "Sumscale" depends upon the
extent to which the 12 inventory items correlate with each
other.

Table 1 provides the pooled within cell correlations

of the 12 inventory items which gives an estimate of the
population correlation with between group variance removed.
Coefficient alpha, which provides the average correlation for
these correlations was .839, indicating that "Sumscale" is
a reliable measure.

Considering these findings, an ANOVA

was performed on "Sumscale."

The results of this analysis

revealed a significant Reward by Competition interaction,
F (1, 52) = 4.747, £ = .034, which indicated that subjects
in the No Reward-Competition condition rated the task as less
interesting overall than subjects in any of the other condi
tions .
No significant main effects or interactions were found
for any of the other inventory items.

However, an analysis

of the direction of the means for the data revealed a non
significant pattern similar to the above findings.

For all

but two of the inventory items ("Play" and "Agree Outside
Pressure"), Rewarded subjects rated themselves as more

TABLE 1
The Pooled Within Cell Correlations of the 12 Inventory Items
With Between Group Variance Removed
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. Exciting
2. Interesting

.655

3. Varied

.381

.339

4. Play

.017

.084

- .075

5. Creative

.371

.315

.245

-.212

6. Enjoyable

.563

.713

.314

.211

.392

7. Satisfying

.404

.286

.202

.132

.404

.485

8. Agree
Interesting

.556

.743

.462

.141

.329

.782

.491

9. Agree
Enj oyable

.395

.574

.268

.303

.357

.643

.471

.672

10. Agree
Outside
Pressure

.086

.010

.289

.233

- .203

.060

-.018

.246

.830

11. Agree Inward
Desire

.491

.468

.017

.113

.346

.609

.332

.407

.410

-.137

12. Agree Gift

.301

.444

.119

.156

.069

.430

-.023

.380

.155

.336

.321

o
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intrinsically motivated in the task than did subjects in the
No Reward condition.

For all but four of the inventory items

("Exciting," "Interesting," "Satisfying," and "Agree Enjoy"),
subjects in the No Competition condition rated themselves as
more intrinsically motivated in the task than did Competitive
subjects.

Finally, for all but two of the inventory items

("Play" and "Agree Outward Pressure"), subjects in the No
Reward-Competition condition rated themselves as less intrin
sically motivated than did subjects in any of the other
conditions.

It should be emphasized that although the pat

tern of these data resemble the significant effects, they
are ultimately nonsignificant in nature.

Thus, any infer

ences based on these results must remain extremely guarded
and only be used to suggest possible directions for future
investigations.
Free Choice Time
An ANOVA was performed on the amount of time subjects
played with the task during the free choice period.

These

results failed to reach statistical significance although
nonsignificant patterns similar to the ones found for the
inventory items were found.

Rewarded subjects played with

the task for more time than did subjects in the No Reward
condition.

Competitive subjects played with the task for

less time than did subjects in the No Competition condi
tion.

Finally, subjects in the No Reward-Competition condi

tion played with the task for less time than did subjects
in any of the other conditions.

Again, such nonsignificant
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findings must be analyzed with extreme caution and considered
as only suggestive of future research.
An inspection of these free choice times revealed a
large degree of variability probably due to the bimodal
distribution of the data.

(See Table 2 for the distribution

of scores in the current design.) For each cell, subjects
had a tendency to play with the task for a relatively long
period of time or for no time at all.

In the Reward-

Competition condition and Reward-No Competition condition,
six subjects did not play with the task at all.

In the No

Reward-Competition condition, eight subjects did not play
with the task at all.

And finally, in the No Reward-No

Competition condition, three subjects did not play with the
task at all.
Because of the substantial number of subjects who did
not play with the task at all during the free choice period,
a chi square test was performed to determine if the fre
quencies of zero scores were different in the four cells.
This analysis failed to reach statistical significance,
2
x
(3) = 3.763, n.s.
Because of the bimodal distribution of the data, another
analysis, was performed where subjects with zero scores
were dropped from the analysis.

An ANOVA was then performed

on the remaining data which included a reciprocal transfor
mat ion of the remaining free choice times.

This transformation

was performed to normalize the time scores, since in general,
time scores do not ordinarily fall into a normalized
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TABLE 2
Amount Of Time Played With Soma (In Seconds)
During Free Choice Period
For Current Design

Reward

Competition

No
Competition

NO

Reward

605

198

591

0

605

0

567

0

576

0

515

0

600

0

463

0

595

0

331

0

586

0

5

0

378

0

0

0

605

19

609

350

595

0

600

326

595

0

600

90

591

0

600

38

586

0

595

0

524

0

572

0

236

0

567

0
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distribution.
icant

When this analysis was performed, no signif

main effects or interactions were found for the

transformed free time scores.*A second transformation of the free choice times was
also performed to normalize the data.
one to all the free choice times.

This involved adding

An ANOVA was then per

formed on the square root of these scores.

This analysis

also failed to reach statistical significance.
Distractor Items
A series of ANOVA was performed on each of the distrac
tor items from both inventories.

They revealed a significant

main effect for Reward on the following items:

"Hard,"

F (1, 52), » 3.38, £ = .072, "Simple, " F (1, 52) = 7.215,
£ = .01, and "Agree Practical," F (1, 52) = 3.327, £ = .074.
The direction of these effects indicated that Rewarded sub
jects found the task more difficult, less simple and more
practical than did subjects in the No Reward condition.
Analysis of Subject Subpopulations
Because of the bimodal distribution of the data, it
was assumed that subjects who scored zero on the free choice
measure were from a different subpopulation than subjects
who didn’t.

These differences were treated as an additional

independent variable related to free choice times.

In other

words, a third independent variable was created statistically
*"In addition, an ANOVA performed on each of the inven
tory items and "Sumscale" with those subjects dropped from
the analysis, failed to reach statistical significance.
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based on the amount of time subjects played with the task
during the free choice period.

Subjects who didn't play with

the task at all were statistically placed in one group
(called Bored), while those who played with the task for
any amount of time were statistically placed in a second
group (called Not Bored).

Thus, the design of the experiment

was converted from a 2 by 2 with two levels of Reward and
two levels of Competition to a 2 by 2 by 2 with two levels
of Reward (Reward and No Reward), two levels of Competition
(Competition and No Competition), and two levels of Bored
(Bored and Not Bored) .
It should be noted that different portions of the in
structions may have also accounted for the bimodal distribu
tion of the data.

Recall that subjects in the No Competition

conditions were informed that the other subject was working
on a task (vocabulary acquisition) different from his
(problem solving ability).

Perhaps after receiving these

instructions, subjects were expecting a relatively boring
task based on problem solving ability.

The lack of play

with the task during the free choice period may have been
due to this expectation.

However, in order for this to be

a tenable, hypothesis, it must be shown that subjects in the
Bored condition were differentially affected by these instruc
tions than were subjects in the Not Bored condition.

This

appears to be highly unlikely for a number of reasons.
In the first place, there is no reason to suspect that a
problem solving task would be perceived as more boring than
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a vocabulary task.

Secondly, the bimodal distribution of

scores was found in all four cells of the design, not just
in those where the above instructions were given.

Finally,

subjects in all four conditions were under the impression
that the task they were working on was a problem solving
task.

Therefore, even if these instructions created an ex

pectation of boredom, the instructions would have been
unlikely to have affected subjects differentially.
A second aspect of the instructions may have also
accounted for the bimodal distribution.

In the instructions

for the free choice period subjects were given three options:
working on some "extra" pictures of the Soma task, reading
some magazines, or simply waiting for the "interview to
finish."

Perhaps subjects in the Bored condition were those

who responded to these instructions only in terms of the
option involving waiting for the interview to end or only
in terms of the option involving reading the magazines.
Since these types of data were not recorded during the free
choice period there is no way of testing the validity of
this hypothesis.

Greater attention to this aspect of the

experiment should be examined in future research.

Again,

however,,there appears to be no intuitive rationale for
suspecting that these instructions would have produced the
observed effects on the subjects during the free choice period.
Table 3 contains the distribution of scores in the
converted design.

The main effects for dependent measures

on the Bored variable indicated that subjects who scored zero
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TABLE 3
Amount Of Time Played With Soma (In Seconds)
During Free Choice Period
For Converted Design
Reward

Competition

NO

Competition

No Reward

Not Bored

Bored

Not Bored

Bored

605

0

591

0

605

0

567

0

576

0

515

0

600

0

463

0

595

0

331

0

586

0

0

378

0

198

0

605

0

609

0

595

0

600

0

595

0

600

0

591

0

600

586

0

595

524

0

572

236

567

19

350
326
90
38
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on the free choice measure differed from subjects who did
not score zero on the free choice measure for the given
dependent variable.

Tables 4 through 10 provide the complete

ANOVA tables for each of the variables in this analysis.
It is important to note that these analyses were performed
on this data as if it were an experimental study.

However,

the Bored variable in the converted design is based on
nothing more than the original dependent measure of free
choice times which is essentially a person variable.

Hence,

any relationships found in the data must be considered cor
relational in nature.

Thus, no statements of causality may

be logically inferred from the analysis.
A summary of the most important findings of the above
analyses fell into one of three main categories:

(1) main

effects and interactions related to the inventory items;
(2) main effects and interactions related to the amount of
time subjects needed to complete the Soma task during the
first part of the experiment and the number of correct items
obtained by subjects during that period, and (3) main effects
and interactions related to the subjects' ratings of their
felt competitiveness.
A main effect for Bored was found on the following in
ventory items:

"Exciting"

(£ = .0001), "Creative"
"Satisfying"

(£ = .003), "Interesting"

(£ = .017), "Enjoyable" {£ = .001),

(£ = .035), "Agree Interesting"

"Agree Enjoyed"

(£ = .0001),

(£ = .006), "Agree Inward Desire"

.0001), "Agree Gift"

(£ = .002), and "Sumscale"

(£ =

(£ = .0001).

TABLE 4
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored For:
Sum of Times For Soma Items Prior to Free Choice Period;
Soma Items Correct Prior to Free Choice Time

Source

df

Sum of Times For Soma Items
Prior to Free Choice Period

Soma Items Correct
Prior to Free Choice Time

Reward

1

.018

.192

Competition

1

2.130

1.698

Bored

1

4.435**

7.722*

Reward X Competition

1

.142

.703

Reward X Bored

1

3.130***

3.250***

Competition X Bored

1

3.133***

2.626

Reward X Competition
X Bored

1

Error
Note:

.450

48
To conserve space, only F values are reported.

*p < .01
**p < .05
***p < .10

1.484

TABLE 5
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored
For the Following Inventory Items: Exciting,
Interesting, Varied and Play

Source

df

Exciting

Interesting

Varied

Play

18.364*

.058

.011

Reward

1

2.768

Competition

1

.561

1.499

.365

.964

Bored

1

9.442**

16.869*

.144

.790

Reward X Competition

1

.079

1.121

1.952

Reward X Bored

1

2.045

.088

.001

Competition X Bored

1

.066

.029

1.040

1.799

Reward X Competition
X Bored

1

.028

.164

.051

.419

Error

5.974***

48

Note:
*p

.201

To conserve space, only F values are reported.
<_

.001

**p < .005
***p £ .05

TABLE 6
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored
For the Following Inventory Items: Creative,
Enjoyable, Satisfying and Agree Interesting

Source

df

Creative

Enjoyable

Agree
Interesting

Reward

1

.884

Competition

1

2.052

Bored

1

6.069**

Reward X Competition

1

4.111

.367

.058

.018

Reward X Bored

1

.377

2.121

.009

1.795

Competition X Bored

1

1.576

.106

.361

.006

Reward X Competition
X Bored

1

6.864**

1.508

.151

Error
Note:

3.853***

Satisfying

.201
13.718*

2.892**

1.521
.720
4.723**

3.937***
.022
14.720*

48
To conserve space, only F values are reported.

*p < .001
**p < .05
***p < .10

oo

TABLE 7
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored For the
Following Inventory Items: Agree Enjoy, Agree Outside Pressure,
Agree Inward Desire and Agree Gift

Source

df

Agree Enjoy

Agree Outside
Pressure

Agree Inward
Desire

Reward

1

1.884

1.834

1.322

Competition

1

1.006

.018

.026

Bored

1

8.313**

.333

67.655*

Agree Gift

4.809***
.255
11.143**

Reward X Competition 1

.088

1.596

2.196

Reward X Bored

1

.141

.007

.732

7.249**

Competition X Bored

1

.287

.101

.600

.686

Reward X Competition .
X Bored

.353

.001

.007

.474

Error
Note:

1.314

48
To conserve space, only F values are reported.

*p £ .001
**p £ .01
***p £ .05

M

TABLE 8
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored
For the Following Inventory Items: Sumscale, Hard,
Simple, Passive and Intuitive

Source

df

Reward

1

Competition

1

Bored

1

Reward x Competition

Sumscale

4.309***

Hard

3.330****

Simple

7.546**

Passive

Intuitive

.517

.837

.022

.703

1.244

1.595

29.915*

2.609

.002

.179

1.626

1

1.846

1.751

1.911

.100

.112

Reward x Bored

1

1.882

.429

1.188

.243

.835

Competition X Bored

1

.034

5.610***

.447

1.526

Reward X Competition
X Bored

1

.556

.663

.500

Error
Note:

.005

3.208****
.005

.001

.

48
To conserve space, only F values are reported.

*p < .001
**p _< .01
oo

***p < .05
****p <_ .10

w

TABLE 9
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored For
the Following Inventory Items: Clear, Agree Important,
Agree Valuable and Agree Practical
Agree
Important

Agree
Valuable

Agree
Practical

df

Clear

Reward

1

.740

.196

.260

Competition

1

2.312

1.200

1.761

Bored

1

.822

.007

.380

4.639*

Reward X Competition

1

.002

.449

.038

.157

Reward X Bored

1

.168

1.038

.023

.375

Competition X Bored

1

.159

.125

.756

.1337

Reward X Competition
X Bored

1

1.145

4.269*

6.777*

Source

Error
Note:

48
To conserve space, only F values are reported.

4.030*
1.678

4.202*

TABLE 10
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored
For the Following Items: Competition Check,
Observation Check and Time Limit Check

Source

df

Competition Check

Reward

1

Competition

1

32.253*

Bored

1

Reward X Competition

Observation Check
1.548

.706

1.127

.601

3.657

.861

.056

1

.123

.853

.071

Reward X Bored

1

1.120

1.167

.874

Competition X Bored

1

7.782

1.461

.954

Reward X Competition
X Bored

1

.182

.304

.026

48

Error
Note:

.005

Time Limit Check

To conserve space, only F values are reported.

*p < .001
**p < .01
oo
on
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In all these analyses, subjects who were in the Bored
condition rated the task as less intrinsically motivating
than did subjects in the Not Bored condition.
For some of the above results, the final interpreta
tion of the data has to be qualified because of interactions
involving the Bored variable.
follows:

These interactions were as

For "Interesting," a significant Bored by Reward

interaction (£ = .018) was reported which indicated that
Not Bored-Reward subjects rated the task as more interesting
than Bored-No Reward subjects.1

For "Creative," a three way

interaction was significant (£ = .012) which indicated that
Bored-Reward-No Competition subjects rated the task as less
creative than did Bored-No Reward-No Competition subjects.
For "Agree Gift," a Bored by Reward interaction was signifi
cant (£ = .01) which indicated that Bored-No Reward subjects
rated themselves as less likely to buy the task as a gift
for a friend than did subjects in any of the other conditions.
A summary of the above findings indicated that Bored
subjects consistently rated the task as less intrinsically
motivating than did subjects in the Not Bored condition.

The

interactions involving the Bored variable were not as clearly
consistent.

The task was rated as less creative by Bored-No

Competition subjects when a reward was present than when it
was absent.

However, the absence of a reward resulted in the

1As in the earlier analyses, a protected t test was
used to test all differences among means for significant
interactions.
A probability level of .10 was chosen to
test for significance.
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Bored subjects rating themselves as less likely to buy the
task as a gift for their friend than subjects in any of the
other conditions.

In addition, the absence of a reward

resulted in the Bored subjects rating the task as less inter
esting than Bored subjects in Reward conditions.
An ANOVA was also performed on the sum of the amount
of time subjects needed to complete the four items of the
Soma task during the first part of the experiment.

The same

analysis was performed on the number of items successfully
completed by subjects during that same time period.

A

significant main effect for Bored resulted which indicated
that Bored subjects needed more time to solve the puzzles
(■£ = .04) and successfully completed less items (£ = .008)
than did subjects in the Not Bored condition.

However, these

results must also be qualified because of significant inter
actions.

For total time needed to solve the original four

items, a significant Bored by Competition interaction
(£ = .083) resulted which indicated that Bored-No Competition
subjects needed more time to solve the puzzles than did
subjects in any of the other conditions.

Additionally, a

significant Bored by Reward interaction (£ = .083) resulted
which indicated that Bored-Reward and Bored-No Reward sub
jects needed more time to solve the problems than Not BoredReward subjects.

For the amount of items correct, a signi

ficant Bored by Reward interaction (£ = .008) resulted which
indicated that Bored-Reward subjects successfully completed
less items than did Not Bored-Reward and Not Bored-No Reward
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subjects, and Bored-No Reward subject successfully completed
less items than did Not Bored-Reward subjects.
Finally, significant main effects for Bored (£ = .062)
and Competition (£ = .0001) was found for subjects ratings
of felt competitiveness.

Examination of these findings

indicated that Bored and Competition subjects rated them
selves as feeling more competitive than did Not Bored and No
Competition subjects respectively.
icant

Additionally, a signif

Bored by Competition interaction (£ = .008) resulted

which indicated that Bored-Competition subjects rated
themselves as feeling more competitive than did subjects in
all other conditions, and that Not Bored-Competitive sub
jects rated themselves as feeling more competitive than did
Bored-No Competition subjects.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
According to the model proposed in the current research,
the presence of an external reward or competition should have
reduced intrinsic motivation.
were not confirmed.

In general, such predictions

A significant main effect for Reward was

found for only two of the inventory items and these were in
the opposite direction as predicted.

In addition, an exam

ination of the means for the remaining dependent measures
(the 12 inventory items, "Sumscale," and the free choice
times) revealed a similar nonsignificant pattern of means
except for two of the inventory items.

Thus, there is no

indication that the present research replicated past find
ings in which external rewards reduced intrinsic motivation.
There was some limited support that the presence of
competition reduces intrinsic motivation.

A significant

main effect (although tempered by an interaction) was found
for one inventory item in the direction predicted by the
theory.

In addition, an examination of the means for the

remaining dependent measures revealed a similar nonsignificant
pattern of means except for four of the inventory items.
An analysis of the subpopulation data also provided some
support that the presence of competition reduces intrinsic
motivation.

Bored subjects rated themselves as significantly

more competitive than those subjects considered as being in
89
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the Not Bored condition.
icant

In other words, there was a signif

relationship between the amount of time subjects
¥

played with the task during the free choice period and their
subjective ratings of competiveness.

Subjects who did not

play with the task at all during this period tended to rate
themselves as feeling more competitive than did subjects who
played with the task for any period of time.

It should be

noted that there was also a significant Competition by Bored
interaction in these data.

However, the nature of this inter

action simply showed that subjects rated themselves as feeling
more competitive in any of the cells where they received
competitive instructions than those cells in which they didn't.
Such a pattern of cell means was to be expected, since the
dependent measure in this case was also a manipulation check
for the competitive instructions.

As such, this interaction

does not constrain the present interpretation of the sub
population data.

However, as stated earlier, the Bored

variable in the current study is based on nothing more than
the original dependent measure of free choice time.

Hence,

any interpretations based on the above findings must be
considered correlational in nature.
Other data found in the study, which are experimental in
nature are compatible with the above findings.

Indeed, the

most consistent significant pattern found in the data, a
Reward by Competition interaction, indicated that No RewardCompetition subjects found the task less intrinsically moti
vating than did subjects in any of the other conditions.

For
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three of the inventory items and "Sumscale" this pattern
was significant.

In addition, subjects in the No Reward-

Competition condition showed less intrinsic motivation than
did subjects in any of the other conditions as measured by
all the dependent measures except two of the inventory items.
This particular order of cell means indicated that the pre
sence of competition reduced intrinsic motivation as long as
it was not coupled with a reward.
Another possible interpretation of the free choice
data comes from considering the subject's initial success
with the Soma task.

An examination of the subpopulation data

indicated that Bored subjects needed significantly more time
to successfully complete the four items of the Soma task
during the first part of the experiment than did subjects in
the Not Bored condition.

There was also a significant Bored

by Reward and Bored by Competition interaction.

However, an

examination of cell means indicated there were no cases
where Not Bored subjects needed more time than Bored subjects
to successfully complete the task.

This was true for any

level of the Reward or Competition variable.

Additionally,

Bored subjects solved significantly less items correctly
than subjects in the Not Bored condition.

Here too, there

was a significant Bored by Reward interaction.

However, an

examination of cell means indicated there were no cases where
Bored subjects solved more problems than did subjects in the
Not Bored condition.
Reward variable.

This was true for any level of the

In other words, subjects who played with
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the task for some period of time during the free choice period
were more successful with the task originally than were sub
jects who did not play with the task at all.

These findings

are quite consistent with Deci's original conception of intrin
sic

motivation.

It could be argued that in the present

study, differences in intrinsic motivation during the free
choice period, were due to differences in feelings of compe
tence generated by early success with the task during the
initial phase of the experiment.

However, it is again impor

tant to emphasize that this data is essentially correlational
in nature.

Subjects placed in the Bored group are essentially

different people than those placed in the Not Bored group
(vis a vis their performance on the Soma task).

Therefore,

the above correlational relationship between success on the
task and intrinsic motivation during the free choice period
may be mediated by an unknown third variable.

As such, all

conclusions must remain merely suggestive in nature.

However,

future research could consider the subjects' competence with
the task in a more systematic fashion.

Conditions of compe

tence could be established through the use of different
levels of competency feedback; or, a preexperimental measure
of the subjects' initial competency with the task could
serve as a potential covariate.

It is unfortunate that the

current methodology precludes this possibility since indivi
dual differences in competence were established under differ
ent experimental conditions.

However, the subpopulation data

cited above certainly indicates the potential relevance of

93

competency

for the cognitive evaluation effect.

In summary, the present research suggests that the
presence of competition may be able to reduce intrinsic moti
vation.

However, there was no support for the contention

that the presence of an external reward will reduce intrin
sic motivation.

Indeed, in the present study, the presence

of a reward seemed to nullify the detrimental effects of
competition.

These results are particularly surprising,

since the current research replicated the basic methodology
of past studies which successfully demonstrated the over
justification effect.

The discussion which follows focuses

on the failure to replicate this effect.

It will be pri

marily concerned with methodological issues, some specific
to the present study and some having a broader scope.
However, these inevitably post hoc interpretations are for
the most part educated second guesses.

While fully cogni

zant of this problem, such speculation provides the foundation
for future improvements in a programatic research program.
One problem in the current study, may have been a lack
of certainty by the subject that he would be permitted to
keep the monetary reward.

Without this belief, the attri-

butional processes needed to initiate the overjustification
effect would never have taken place.

To assess whether

subjects felt they would keep the money, they were asked
quite directly during the post experimental interview if
they felt that the money earned during the experiment was
theirs to keep.

Only two subjects responded negatively to
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this question and they were subsequently dropped from the
analysis.

However, it is possible that the remaining sub

jects assumed they could keep the reward only at the point
when asked the question during the post experimental inter
view.

The demands during the interview may have favored

such a response— the experiment was over, the subject prob
ably felt relaxed, and the experimenter had not asked for
any of the money to be returned.

At this point, it is

doubtful that the subject would suspect the experimenter's
original claim about keeping the money.

However, this might

not have been the case during the actual experimental
session.

Subjects might have found it quite unusual to be

paid for participating in an experiment for which they were
also to receive academic credit.

Indeed, although subjects

were instructed to take the 50 cent piece for each item
they successfully completed, few actually did.

Even after

the free choice period was over, most subjects left the
money they earned in the box in front of them.

It was only

during the post experimental interview that most of the sub
jects physically took possession of the money.

Therefore,

it is possible that during the experiment, subjects doubted
they were actually going to keep the money and were only .
finally convinced during the post experimental interview.
If this was the case, the attributional processes needed to
initiate the overjustification effect would never have taken
place.

It is important to note that the above arguments

must remain speculative in nature.

Indeed, there is some
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evidence that subjects did respond to the Reward variable as
indicated by the main effect for Reward on two of the inven
tory items.

However, these results are by no means definitive,

and so the above discussion remains as a viable criticism
of the current methodology.
To deal with this potential methodological weakness,
subjects must be clearly convinced that they can keep any
monetary reward when it is initially presented.

One possible

strategy for accomplishing this would utilize the sign-up
sheets used by subjects to register for different experi
ments.

These sign-up sheets are usually posted on bulletin

boards and provide such details as the time and place of an
experiment.

For a future study, it might prove advantageous

if these sheets also provided information concerning pay
ment.

Half the sign-up sheets would indicate that partici

pating in the study could result in the winning of a mone
tary reward, while the remaining sheets would include no such
statement.

It would be expected that after registering on

such a sign-up sheet, the subject would be more inclined to
believe he would keep any money earned during the actual
experiment.

In addition, such a procedure would increase

the possibility that the subject would attribute his reason
for participating in the experiment to the monetary reward
rather than an academic requirement.

Of course, an argument

could be made that such a registration process would not
guarantee a random assignment of subjects to the different
Reward conditions.

However, this is very doubtful since it
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is very likely that all possible subjects would be predis
posed to register for the Reward condition.

In other words,

the actual assignment of subjects to the various conditions
would be more a function of who got to the Reward sign-up
sheet first, rather than any selection bias.
A second explanation for the lack of positive results
for the Reward variable may lie in the subject’s initial
interest in the Soma task.

Studies reviewed earlier

(Calder & Staw, 1975b; Lonky, 1978; McLoyd, 1979; Upton,
1973) indicated that a necessary precondition for the over
justification effect is an initial interest in the target
activity.

If the target activity is of low initial interest,

a reinforcement effect is likely to occur.
been the case in the present study.

This may have

On a purely intuitive

level, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Soma task
might have not been a very interesting task for the sub
jects in the present experiment.

Subjects may have found

the task too simple and lacking any challenge to stimulate
their interest.

Indeed, there may be some empirical justi

fication for this premise.

Subjects in the present study

worked with the same Soma items as did those in Deci's
(1971, 1972a) earlier research.

However, an examination of

the pertinent available data from Deci's research indicated
that his subjects may have found the task more difficult
than those in the present study.

Subjects in Deci's (1971)

study correctly solved an average of 2.38 items in the Reward
condition.

Subjects in the Reward-No Competition condition
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of the present study (which is conceptually similar to
Deci's Reward subjects) correctly solved an average of
2.79 items.

Additionally, prior to the free choice period

in Deci's 1971 study, Rewarded subjects needed an average of
372.5 seconds to solve each item.
428.4 seconds per item was needed.

For No Reward subjects,
In his 1972a study, sub

jects in the Reward condition which was similar to the one
in the present study, needed an average of 314.2 seconds to
solve each item.

In the Control condition, an average of

307.7 seconds per item was needed.

In comparable cells in

the present study, subjects needed an average of 189 seconds
(Reward-No Competition condition) and 180 seconds (No
Reward-No Competition condition) to solve each item.

Thus,

Deci's subjects needed more time and successfully completed
less items than subjects working on the same task in the
current study.

This may indicate that Deci's subjects

found the task more difficult, more challenging, and there
fore probably more intrinsically motivating to begin with
than did subjects in the present study.

Perhaps for the

subjects in the present study, the task was not initially
interesting enough for the overjustification effect to mani
fest itself.

Indeed, the reinforcement pattern observed in

some of the data is quite consistent with this assumption.
An examination of the free choice data also supports
the above premise.

Recall that free choice instructions

reminded subjects that they could continue to work with the
Soma task during this period.

This reminder was included,
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since without it, pilot subjects did not play with the task
during the free choice period.

Yet despite the possible

demands initiated by these instructions in the experimental
situation, 23 subjects did not play with the task for any
period of time during the free choice period.

This is one

less than 50 percent of all the subjects in the study.

This

indifference to the Soma task during the free choice period
may be an indication of the lack of initial interest for
the task.
In line with the above argument, it is interesting to
note that two of the distractor items ("Hard" and "Simple")
resulted in significant main effects for Reward.

Rewarded

subjects rated the task as more difficult and less simple
than did subjects in the No Reward condition.

Perhaps in

this study, because of the lack of initial interest in the
task, the presence of a reward convinced the subjects that
the task was more difficult, and thus more challenging and
intrinsically motivating.

Otherwise, the subjects may have

wondered why they were being paid.

This explanation could

also account for the pattern among Rewarded subjects to play
with the task for a longer period of time and to rate it as
more intrinsically motivating than did subjects in the No
Reward condition.
Future research should more clearly consider the sub
ject's initial interest in the task.

There are various

methodologies which can accomplish this.

For example,

Calder and Staw (1975b) presented subjects with tasks that
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were previously assessed as being interesting or not inter
esting.

McLoyd (1979) used his subject's initial choice of

target activities to establish initial interest.

Upton

(1973) used his subject's actual history with the target
activity to determine initial interest.

Another strategy

for dealing with this issue might consider the subject's
initial interest in the task as a possible covariate.

Base

line measures obtained during preexperimental situations
would be assumed to be the subject's initial interest in
the task.

With this information in hand, methodologies

similar to that used in the present study could be employed
with initial interest statistically controlled.
Finally, the lack of positive findings for Reward in the
present study may suggest that the theory of cognitive eval
uation or overjustification are simply not valid hypotheses.
Of course, since the most general pattern in the data en
tailed accepting the null hypothesis, such deductions cannot
be legitimately made.

However, a number of recent unpub

lished dissertations also produced null findings.

The

specific components of these various studies differed from
each other and the present research because of unique focuses
of interest.

However, each included elements of the basic

paradigm where an external reward was offered to the subjects
for engaging in the target activity.

For example, in a

study by Effron (1976), various categories of external incen
tives (performance contingent incentives, competency feedback,
performance contingent incentives plus competency feedback,
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task contingent incentives, and performance contingent
incentives which suggested superior performance)
produce the overjustification effect.

failed to

Subjects who volun

teered for a study by Palmer (1977) showed no decrement in
intrinsic motivation for a reading activity when rewarded
with money.
Lepper et al.

Parish (1976) replicated the methodology of
(1973) using trinkets as a reward and found

no significant effects for third graders.

Campbell (1976)

rewarded groups of children each consisting of five, three,
or two subjects.

No subsequent decrease in intrinsic moti

vation was reported.

Kesselman (1975) and Cohen (1974)

found that monetary reward did not impair intrinsic motivation
for a hidden word task.

In addition, verbal reward did not

enhance intrinsic motivation in Cohen's study.

Schooler

(1976) rewarded subjects for either participating in a low
interest task (listening to the repetitive recording of a
human voice) or high interest task (listening to music).
One group of subjects rewarded themselves in terms of what
they felt they deserved for listening to the target activity.
A second group was yolked to this group and received the
same amount of reward.

A control group received no reward.

No significant main effects or interactions were reported.
Witt (1975) reported similar findings.

There was no subse

quent decrement in intrinsic motivation for high or low
interest groups when given an unexpected or expected reward.
Thus, a number of unpublished studies report very dif
ferent findings than those described in the published
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literature.

One set of results seems to indicate that the

overjustification effect is a viable hypothesis, while the
other set provides very little supporting evidence.

The

critical question is why do studies using very similar
methodologies produce very different results and conclusions.
The solution to this empirical and conceptual incon
sistency may be related to an extremely significant issue
which has received the attention of a number of psychologists.
This concern has taken the form of questioning the adequacy
of traditional research strategies for dealing with beha
vioral phenomenon at a sufficient level of complexity where
generalizations can be made beyond the experimental situa
tion (Petrinovich, 1979).

This issue has been explored by

Campbell and Stanley (1963) in terms of external and internal
validity.

Internal validity refers to the procedures and

safeguards the psychologist must employ to assure carefully
controlled experimental conditions.

External validity, on

the other hand, raises the question of the generalizability
of the results.

To establish external validity, it becomes

important to select representational samples of subjects and
experimental situations.
It is this last point which may be critical in attempt
ing to integrate the absence of positive results for the
present and previously reviewed dissertations with those
found in the published literature.

It may be the case that

the extreme fine tuning of experimental operations found in
this and most research designs may seriously limit real
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world phenomena from manifesting themselves.

Wiggins

(1973)

has stated that "the laws which govern the isolated frag
ments of behavior studied in the contrived laboratory situa
tions may be of a different order than the laws which govern
behavior in many complex natural situations"

(p. 4).

Brunswick (1956) noted many years ago that traditional
systematic designs almost inevitably involve the use of
atypical situations for the behavior in question and explore
this behavior in an atypical context.
These arguments seem to suggest that if the experimental
procedures do not adequately characterize the ecological
context of the phenomenon under question,

even the most

rigorously controlled operations may fail to produce re
sults.

This may have been the case in the present study.

In an attempt to test the overjustification hypothesis,
ratings of inventory items and free choice times served as
dependent measures under various conditions of reward and
competition.

The operational definitions of these different

variables clearly met the requirement of an internally valid
study.

However, the choice of these particular operational

definitions was in some sense ultimately arbitrary.

It is

this "arbitrariness" which may be the weakest link in the
current methodology.

For example, does the playing with the

Soma task during an academically required activity, truly
characterize the nature of intrinsic motivation found in
naturalistic settings?

Does such an experience resemble

the curiosity of the exploring preschooler, the high school
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student who incessantly reads his or her encyclopedia, or
the distinguished scientist who devotes half a lifetime to
solve what for most would be an extremely difficult and
complex problem?

In a similar fashion, does the presenta

tion of a two dollar reward to college freshman fulfilling
an academic obligation which required one hour of their time
truly resemble the detrimental effect that twelve years of
grading may have on a student's intrinsic motivation?

There

is no way of absolutely knowing the answers to these ques
tions, but it is a strong possibility that the operations
used during this experiment (and perhaps in the disserta
tions previously reviewed) may have violated the integrity
of the phenomenon being studied.

The lack of external

validity in the present study may have prevented the over
justification effect from manifesting itself.
The issues raised above are not only limited to in
vestigators of the overjustification effect.

Indeed, the

field of experimental psychology will continue to labor
under a limited context until solutions to these method
ological problems are developed.

Perhaps a step in the

direction of those solutions is provided by a methodological
approach emphasizing the experimental analysis of.behavior
using a single-subject design (Robinson & Foster, 1979).
This approach departs from traditional large-N experimenta
tion where many subjects are assigned to different conditions,
and statistical procedures are used to infer differences
between groups.

Single-subject designs involve intrasubject
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comparisons where each subject serves as his or her own
control.

These comparisons are made by focusing on the

subject's behavior before and during the administration of
a given independent variable and after its removal.
The relevance of single-subject designs to the discus
sion of ecological validity rests in the choice of a depen
dent measure.

In most single-subject designs, this involves

an initial period of observation where accurate measurement
of the natural frequency of the target behaviors under study
are made (Hersen & Barlow, 1976).

These initial assessments

are not necessarily limited to a single behavior but may
involve multiple dependent measures.

A crucial element in

the choice of these dependent measures involves observing
the subject in his or her natural setting.

Thus, one strong

feature of this methodological approach is that the integrity
of the phenomenon in its natural setting is preserved.
It is also important that the stability and range of
variability of these target behaviors be fully examined.
Once stable and consistent behavioral patterns begin to
emerge, these dependent measures may be considered an appro
priate target for experimentation.

At this point, the inde

pendent variable of interest may be administered to the
subject.

Differences between target behaviors before and

after this administration are compared and logical deductions
can be made.

To increase the base for generalization from

a single-subject design, the same experimental procedure may
be replicated using different subjects (.Hersen & Barlow, 1976) .
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The single-subject design allows for the systematic
study of the phenomenon in its ecological context.

It also

allows for the systematic application of experimental proce
dures to the behavior under question.

This synthesis of

these two broadly different methodological traditions may
provide a viable framework for future investigations of
the overjustification effect.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
COPY OF THE FIRST INVENTORY MEASURING
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
Below are a number of rating scales on which you are to in
dicate your impression of the task you just worked on. Please
put an X on the appropriate line which indicates how you felt
about the task.
easy

hard
~1~

~2~

~T~

4

~5~

~6~

~T~

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

~T~

~2~

T “ T"

5

~6~

~T~

~~2~

~3~

4

T "

~T~

T"

~2~

~

3~

4

T“ ~6~

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

~T~

3

~T~

~5~

6

~ T

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

~T~

~2~

~

3~

~4~

5

~6~

~ T

~T~

—

“

3“

~4~

5

~6~

~ T

2

” 3”

~4~

T"

~~6~

7

~2~

3

~T~

T“

~6~

7

exciting

dull

complex

simple

interesting

boring

routine

varied

work
active

play

“
T~

passive

creative

uncreative

rational

intuitive

unenjoyable

enjoyable

satisfying
1

ambiguous

“
T"
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dissatisfying
clear

APPENDIX B
COPY OF THE SECOND INVENTORY MEASURING
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
Below is ,a number of statements about how you might have
felt about the task you just worked on. Below each state
ment is a scale which measures the extent to which you agree
or disagree with the statement.
Please place an X on any
point on the scale which would be a good indication of how
much you agree or disagree with the statement.
I found the task to be important.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE
1 2

3

4

I felt the task was interesting.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE
1 2

3

4

I enjoyed working on the task.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE
1 2

3

4

I found the task to be valuable.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE

During the part of the experiment when I had the opportunity
to read some magazines, play with the task, or sit and do
nothing,(I felt motivated by outside pressure to choose to
work on the task.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE

During the part of the experiment described above, I felt
motivated by inward desire to choose to work on the task.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE
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I would be interested in buying this task as a gift for a
friend.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

I found the task to be practical.
STRONGLY DISAGREE

STRONGLY AGREE
1

2

3

APPENDIX C
COPY OF THE SCALES MEASURING THE EFFECT OF BEING OBSERVED
AND OF THE PRESENCE OF A TIME LIMIT
On the following scale, please indicate to what extent you
felt your behavior on the task was affected by being ob
served by me.
It was not
affected
at all

It was
affected
____________________________ very much

On the following scale, please indicate to what extent you
felt your behavior on the task was affected by a time
limit.
It was not
It was
affected
affected
at all_________ ____________________________ very much
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APPENDIX D
COPY OF THE SCALE MEASURING
FELT COMPETITIVENESS
To what extent did you have competitive feelings towards the
other subject in the experiment?
I felt very
competitive.

____________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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I didn't feel
competitive at all.

APPENDIX E
THE POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Were the instructions clear?
What do you think the hypothesis of this study was?
Have you experienced or heard of the task you just
played with?
Were you aware of the other subject's performance?
Did the music affect you in any way?
Do you think it interfered with your performance?
At any point, did you feel .deceived during this experi
ment?
Did you feel free to do what you wanted while I was
interviewing the other subject?
Had you previously read all these magazines?
Could you hear me interview the other subject?
Do you believe you will keep the money?
When did you think I was watching you during this ex
periment?
Were you suspicious about the extra samples of the task
lying around?
Do you know the other subject in the experiment?
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